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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: Whether the granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when the record before the District Court showed genuine issues of material facts 
in dispute? 
Standard of Review. Because a district court does not resolve issues of fact at 
summary judgment, the appellate court considers the record as a whole and reviews the 
district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, reciting all facts and fair inferences 
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (Poteet v. White, 
2006 UT 63,17,147 P.3d 439). 
SECOND ISSUE: Whether the granting of Defendant City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when Defendant City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment showed on its face genuine issues of material facts in dispute? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is de novo. (Id). 
THIRD ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendant City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment when Defendant City was not entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is de novo. (Id). 
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FOURTH ISSUE: Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendant City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment when Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
its accompanying Memorandum, inappropriately relied on the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from a previously-held injunction hearing? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is de novo. (Id). 
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether the grant of summary judgment should be reversed 
because the order granting summary judgment did not contain an adequate written statement 
of the grounds and facts upon which by the District Court relied in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant City? 
Standard of Review. When the issue before the appellate court is whether, in light of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), the trial court adequately supported its decision to grant 
a motion for summary judgment, enabling the appellate court to review the trial court's 
decision properly, the appellate court will review the trial court's summary judgment ruling 
for correctness. (Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2001 UT App 277, f 8, 34 P.3d 234). 
SIXTH ISSUE: Whether the District Court incorrectly denied Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
Standard of Review. A district court has broad discretion to rule on a motion to set 
aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, an 
appellate court reviews a district court's denial of a 60(b) motion under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review. It is well established that 60(b) motions should be liberally 
granted; therefore, a district court should exercise its discretion in favor of granting relief so 
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that controversies can be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. Accordingly, it 
is an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment if 
there is a reasonable justification for the moving party's failure and the party requested 60(b) 
relief in a timely fashion. (Menzies v. Galetka. 2006 UT 81, H 54,150 P.3d 480). 
Moreover, a ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment must be based on 
adequate findings of fact and on the law. An appellate court reviews a district court's 
findings of fact under a clear error standard of review. An appellate court reviews a district 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, affording the trial court no deference. (IcL [^55). 
SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether the denial of Plaintiff s Rule 60(b) Motion to Set 
Aside the Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment was improper 
without providing Plaintiff the hearing Plaintiff had requested pursuant to URCP Rule 7? 
Standard of Review. In challenging a discretionary decision of the lower court, a 
party must demonstrate that the court exceeded the measure of discretion the law affords it. 
This is done by showing that there is no reasonable basis for the court's decision. (Dep't of 
Natural Res, v. Butler. 2006 UT App 444, ^ 7,147 P.3d 963). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment granted to Defendant City by the 
Fifth District Court and a reversal of the order of the Fifth District Court which denied 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment is sought. 
Plaintiff owns several parcels of real property located within City of LaVerkin, Utah 
(supra and infra "Defendant City"). In late 1998 or early 1999, Plaintiff purchased property 
located at 95 South State Street (hereinafter "95 State Property") located within Defendant 
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City. (R. 3; 387; 7951 at 24 & 65). Plaintiff purchased the 95 State Property with the intent of 
operating a business involving the acquisition, repair, and sale of damaged vehicles. (R. 2-4; 
795 at 26-27, 163-167). Plaintiffs business also included the repair of vehicles owned by 
third-party customers. (R. 2-4). From the onset, Plaintiff disclosed his intentions for the 
property to a number of employees and agents of Defendant City, including the Building 
Inspector, the Mayor, and members of City Council. (R. 2; 793 at 15; 795 at 163-167). 
Following Plaintiffs purchase of the 95 State Property, Plaintiff requested from 
Defendant City preliminary approval to use the 95 State Property for an auto body shop and 
used car dealership. (R. 302; 388). After discussing concerns related to parking and screened 
fencing, Defendant City granted Plaintiff preliminary approval for an auto body repair shop, 
which may have included approval to also sell used vehicles. (R. 302-303; 795 at 63-64). 
Defendant City notified Plaintiff of their future intentions to widen the road south of and 
abutting the 95 State Property and requested that Plaintiff place his fence ten feet from the 
property line. (R. 303). Plaintiff refurbished the 95 State Property in full compliance with 
the requests of Defendant City. (R. 3). Plaintiff operated his business known as "Keystone 
Repair" from the 95 State Property. (R. 4). 
In December of 1999, Plaintiff applied for a conditional-use permit and business 
license that would allow him to lawfully operate his business at the 95 State Property. (R. 3; 
xThe depositions of Robert Craig Stevens, Douglas B. Wilson, and Benjamin Reeves were 
entered into the record of the District Court at a preliminary injunction hearing held on April 13, 
2006. However, the District Court did not paginate for this appeal each page of these depositions, 
but only the first page of each deposition. Therefore, each citation to these depositions will contain 
a citation to the first page of the deposition with an additional pin-point cite to the specific page(s) 
of the deposition cited. 
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389; 795 at 65-66 & Exhibit 6). Defendant City granted Plaintiff a conditional-use permit 
and a business license for the 2000 calender year on the sole condition that sewer 
requirements were met (R. 4; 314; 390; 795 at 69-70). The conditional-use permit did not 
set forth any other conditions and was not subject to any expiration date. (R. 314). Although 
the minutes from the meeting indicate that Defendant City granted a conditional-use permit 
and business license for an "auto body shop", the use for the 95 State Property was always 
auto body repair and auto sales. (R. 314; 390-391; 795 at 69-71). 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant City understood that Plaintiffs business consisted of 
repairing cars brought in by his customers, as well as, acquiring, repairing, and selling 
wrecked vehicles purchased personally by Plaintiff. (R. 2-4; 388; 392; 793 at 15, 31-32; 795 at 
31, 69-71, 167-168). Douglas Wilson, the mayor of Defendant City at the time that Plaintiff 
first requested a conditional-use permit for the 95 State Property, understood that Plaintiffs 
business would include Plaintiffs personal acquisition, repair, and sale of wrecked cars, as 
well as the repair of cars brought in by his customers. (R. 793 at 31-32). Plaintiff also 
purchased auto parts for use in the repair of the wrecked vehicles and would occasionally act 
as a parts-broker for third-party customers in need of automotive parts. (R. 388; 795 at 94-
96). In fact, in the year 2000, Defendant City actually approached Plaintiff about purchasing 
a refurbished vehicle to be owned and used by Defendant City. (R. 793 at 16-17). 
Defendant City renewed Plaintiffs business license each consecutive year until 
January of 2006. The business license applications sometimes stated that the license was for 
an "auto body" business and other times for an "auto body and sales" business. (R. 795 at 
Exhibit 6, 7, 8, & 9). In 2002 or 2003, Plaintiff sought clarification from Defendant City 
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about the scope of his business license. (R. 795 at 73). Following a review, Defendant City 
concluded that Plaintiff had always intended to acquire, repair, and sell vehicles, and that it 
was for that purpose that initial use the permit was given. (R. 795 at 73). 
In early 2002, Plaintiff contemplated purchasing property located at 160 South State 
Street in Defendant City (hereinafter "160 State Property"). (R. 4; 795 at 27). At the time, 
the 160 State Property was covered with refuse, including burned out or stripped cars, old 
mattresses, discarded household appliances, etc. (R. 4; 795 at 28-29). 
Plaintiff intended to use the 160 State Property to store vehicles that were awaiting 
service. (R. 4; 795 at 30). Before purchasing the 160 State Property, Plaintiff notified 
Defendant City of his intended use of the 160 State Property. (R. 4; 795 at 30, 169-170). 
Defendant City approved of Plaintiff s intended use of the 160 State Property and informed 
Plaintiff that the 160 State Property would be treated as an extension of Plaintiff s existing 
business located at the 95 South Property. (R. 5; 795 at 30, 83, 85, & 96). Plaintiff never 
inquired in to, and Defendant City never required, Plaintiff to obtain a separate conditional-
use permit for the 160 State Property. (R. 795 at 30). Defendant City encouraged Plaintiff to 
purchase the 160 State Property, which he did in April 2002. (R. 5; 387; 795 at 27, 30,170). 
Plaintiff then spent considerable time and effort cleaning up the 160 State Property; thereby 
vasdy improving its appearance and condition, including the installation of an opaque fence 
to prevent further accumulation of garbage and to protect the vehicles he intended to store 
there. (R. 5; 391; 795 at 28-30). 
On January 7, 2004, after using the 160 State Property for more than two (2) years as 
a storage location for Keystone Repair, Plaintiff sought a conditional-use permit to operate a 
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used-car lot on the front portion of the 160 State Property. (R. 5; 326; 391; 795 at 86, 99). 
Defendant City granted Plaintiff a six-month conditional use permit to Plaintiff, but 
stipulated that the permit applied to the entire 160 State Property, not just the front portion. 
Plaintiff was not permitted to display more than twenty re-furbished cars for sale on the 
front portion of the 160 State Property. (R. 5; 326; 391; 795 at 86). Plaintiff was present and 
participated in Defendant City's Council meeting in which this took place. (R. 391; 795 at 86-
87). Defendant City claimed that it had received complaints regarding visibility problems 
allegedly caused by vehicles that Plaintiff had parked along 100 South, adjacent to his 95 
State Property. (R. 326-327). Although Plaintiff felt as if Defendant City was doing a bit of a 
"railroad job," Plaintiff did not attempt to appeal any of the conditions of the conditional-
use permit to Defendant City's Board of Adjustment (R. 393; 795 at 101, 103, 173). 
In September of 2004, Defendant City approved an additional six-month conditional 
use permit for Plaintiff to continue using the 160 State Property as a used car lot (R 795 at 
87-88 & Exhibit 10). However, the conditional-use permit approved at that this meeting 
contained several conditions that were not included in the original conditional use permit 
issued on January 7, 2004. (R. 795 at 87). These additional conditions included: that only 
operable towing vehicles and construction equipment could be within the fenced area; that 
existing out-of-compliance signage must be removed; and that an engineer-approved eight 
foot block wall must be installed on the backside of the property. (R. 6; 795 at Exhibit 11). 
Plaintiff contended that these conditions were arbitrary and capricious, as Plaintiff 
already had an existing six-foot wall on the property that complied with the City Code at the 
time. (R. 6; 795 at 101). Plaintiff offered to buttress and extend his existing wall in order to 
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satisfy Defendant City's request, but Defendant City refused and demanded that Plaintiff 
build an entirely new masonry wall. (R. 6). However, Defendant City had not required any 
other commercially-zoned property in this area to construct an eight-foot tall block wall. (R. 
6; 795 at 102). Plaintiff was present and participated at this meeting. Plaintiff did not 
attempt to appeal any of these additional conditions placed on the Plaintiffs property and 
business. (R. 393; 795 at 103). 
On October 13, 2004, Defendant City held a Joint Work Meeting of the City Council 
and the Planning Commission to discuss Plaintiffs the 95 State Property and 160 State 
Property. (R. 343-346). During the meeting, the City Council and Planning Commission of 
Defendant City discussed the history and intent of the original conditional-use permit 
granted for the 95 State Property. (R. 343). The Mayor Pro Tern, Gary McKell, stated that 
the first request for a conditional-use permit was in 1999, and that the stated intent in the 
minutes was for an auto body shop, with the expectation that Plaintiff would only be 
repairing customer vehicles. (R. 343). The members of the Joint Work Meeting indicated 
their belief that Plaintiffs use of the property to store and refurbish wrecked vehicles was 
unauthorized and exceeded the scope of Plaintiff s conditional use permit for the 95 State 
Property. (R. 344). 
Participants at the meeting expressed their belief that Plaintiffs business was unsafe 
because cars were parked along the side of the road where children walk to school. (R. 343). 
The members of the Joint Work Meeting also stated that Plaintiffs business was an eyesore 
and that the it was a type of business that Defendant City did not want in their city. (R. 343). 
The discussion ended with the. Council resolving to make Plaintiffs operation of his business 
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at the 95 State Property conditional on his satisfaction of the following new conditions: (1) 
the wrecked vehicles must be kept out of sight; (2) auto body for specific customer use only; 
his use did not could as customer use; (3) parking must include the current requirement for 
customers and refurbished only cars; (4) no vehicles within the thirty foot radius of the 
corner; (5) only refurbished cars on the front of the property; and (6) parking on 100 South 
for customer parking only. (R. 346). Defendant City stated that this was a way to change 
Plaintiffs business, and that Plaintiff would have to accept these conditions or there would 
be a violation and Defendant City could then close down Plaintiffs business. (R. 346). 
In late 2004, Defendant City then modified its ordinances to define any business 
which purchases damaged vehicles as a "salvage yard": 
WRECKING/SALVAGE YARD: Any automotive business that relies on 
vehicles that are damaged and brought to the business for repair or for salvage by 
persons who have no interest in the repair or salvage of said vehicle. Resale or 
salvage value for the business shall not be a consideration of interest in the repair 
or salvage of the vehicle. (R. 6, 355) 
However, at the time of Plaintiffs request for a conditional-use permit and business license, 
Defendant City did not have any statute that defined either a "wrecking yard", "automobile 
graveyard", "junkyard", or "salvage yard." The only statutory definition applicable to such 
facilities at the time were those set forth in U.C.A. §72-7-202. Defendant City did, however, 
have sections within its code which defined "junk or salvage yards" as offensive businesses, 
(R. 309), required a special permit for such businesses, (R. 309), set forth specific procedures 
for applying for a permit, (R. 309), and required that the City Clerk/Recorder request a 
report from the Southwestern District Health Department and present it to the City Council 
for review. (R. 310). None of these procedures were ever required of Plaintiff. 
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On December 15, 2004, Defendant City held a review hearing to consider revoking 
Plaintiffs conditional-use permit on the 95 State Property because of the Plaintiffs alleged 
non-compliance with the conditions placed upon the 95 State Property. (R. 393; 795 at 104-
105). Plaintiff was present and participated in the this hearing. (R. 393; 795 at 104-105). At 
the conclusion of this hearing, Defendant City decided to modify the conditional-use permit 
by converting it to a temporary, six-month conditional-use permit. (R. 394; 795 at 108-109). 
Defendant City also placed some additional conditions on the conditional-use permit. (R. 
394-395; 795 at 108-109, 114-116). On or about January 7, 2005, Defendant City issued the 
modified conditional-use permit for the 95 State Property. (R. 396; 795 at 111). Plaintiff did 
not appeal Defendant City's approval of the modified 95 State Property conditional-use 
permit or its issuance. (R. 396; 795 at 112). 
At some point, Defendant City determined that the work it desired to do on 100 
South, including widening and improving the road, would significantly decrease the distance 
between the road and the 95 State Property. (R. 794 at 43). This road work would decrease 
the set back distances so much that the existing building would be non-compliant with 
certain zoning regulations and would may need to be condemned. (R. 794 at 43-44). 
Defendant City concluded that in the event that Defendant City were able to acquire 
ownership of the 95 State Property from Plaintiff, Defendant City would be able to widen 
the road, as well as, eliminate Defendant City's on-going concerns with Plaintiffs business at 
the 95 State Property. (R. 794 at 44). Defendant City also intended to convert the 95 State 
Property into a new maintenance shop, used to repair and maintain Defendant City's vehicles 
and equipment. (R. at 175). 
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On June 1, 2005, Defendant City conducted a review hearing to consider the 
revocation/non-renewal of Plaintiffs 160 State Property conditional-use permit based upon 
Plaintiffs alleged non-compliance with certain conditions. (R. 397; 795 at 120-121). At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Defendant City voted to revoke/not renew the temporary 160 
State Property conditional-use permit. (R. 6; 398; 795 at 121-122). Plaintiff was under the 
impression that Defendant City had merely revoked/did not renew the temporary 
conditional-use permit that was issued for the 160 State Property on January 7, 2004 and that 
the original conditional-use permit was still valid. (R. 398; 795 at 121-122). 
On August 17, 2005, Defendant City conducted a review hearing to consider the 
revocation/non-renewal of Plaintiff s modified 95 State Property conditional-use permit. (R. 
398; 795 at 125-126). Defendant City alleged that Plaintiff was non-compliant with the 
conditions (i.e. auto body work for specific customer use only; only refurbished cars on the 
front of the property, etc.,) that had been placed on the 95 State Property. (R. 398). Plaintiff 
was present at the meeting and presented evidence in support of his position that he had a 
grandfathered use of the 95 State Property and argued that Defendant City should not 
revoke/not renew his conditional-use permit for the 95 State Property. (R. 398; 795 at 126). 
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the hearing, Defendant City voted to revoke/not renew 
the modified 95 State Property conditional-use permit. (R. 7; 398; 795 at 127). Plaintiff did 
not appeal the revocation/non-renewal of the 95 State Property to the LaVerkin Board of 
Adjustment. (R. 399; 795 at 139-140). 
In 2005, the Plaintiff realized that Defendant City wanted his business out of the city. 
Rather than fight Defendant City, Plaintiff attempted to negotiate a settlement that would 
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provide him sufficient time to wind down his business in an orderly fashion. These 
negotiations started informally in or about May of 2005. Plaintiff offered to close down his 
business if Defendant City would only allow him two years to methodically eliminate his 
extensive inventory of damaged but repairable vehicles. (R. 7; 795 at 140-141). Plaintiffs 
main concern was that he be given a reasonable time to process and sell off his inventory; a 
number of cars that, in the aggregate, was valued at over eighty thousand dollars 
($800,000.00). (R. 7) Plaintiff suggested that he sell his property to Defendant City once he 
had reduced and dissolved his business. (R. 795 at 144). Plaintiff asserted that he needed at 
least eighteen (18) months to complete the refurbishment of vehicles that he had in stock 
and to remove all of the vehicles, tools, equipment and supplies. Defendant City insisted on 
a much more rapid removal. Despite the fact that Plaintiff would personally guaranteed his 
compliance with such an agreement, Defendant City rejected the offer. (R. 7). 
At some point after these informal negotiations began, Defendant City ordered an 
appraisal of Plaintiff s 95 State Property. (R. 8; 366-367). The appraisal dated December 19, 
2005 (hereinafter "City's Appraisal"), estimated that just compensation for the 95 State 
Property would be three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00). (R. 367). However, 
Plaintiff believed that the fair market value of the property at that time was around four 
hundred thousand to four hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($400,000.00 - $450,000.00). 
(R. 401; 795 at 152-153). 
On January 3, 2006, Plaintiff received a demand letter sent by Defendant City, 
through special legal counsel, which informed the Plaintiff of Defendant City's demand to be 
permitted to purchase the Plaintiffs 95 State Property. (R. 8; 16; 363-364). The letter 
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contained a copy of the City's Appraisal of the 95 State Property and a proposed commercial 
real estate purchase contract that was prepared for Plaintiffs signature. (R. 8; 16; 795 at 
Exhibit 19 & 20). In said letter, Defendant City offered to pay Plaintiff three hundred 
thousand dollars ($300,000.00) for the 95 State Property, plus ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) in moving expenses. (R. 8; 16; 363). 
The January 3, 2006 Letter sent by Defendant City also threatened Plaintiff with 
specific consequences that would follow if Plaintiff were to reject the offer of Defendant 
City to purchase Plaintiffs 95 State Property. The letter threatened Plaintiff that if he did 
not accept this offer within one (1) day, then Defendant City would respond with the 
following actions: (1) an injunction against the Plaintiffs business; (2) an order of abatement 
allowing Defendant City to enter the property, to abate whatever they considered to be a 
nuisance, and to charge Plaintiff for any costs accrued during the abatement; (3) criminal 
prosecution of Plaintiff by Defendant City for operating a noxious business; and (4) criminal 
prosecution of Plaintiff by Defendant City for operating a business without a license. (R. 9; 
16; 363). The letter gave Plaintiff a deadline of 5:00 p.m. on January 4, 2006, approximately 
one(l) day after receipt of the letter, to accept Defendant City's offer to purchase the 95 
State Property. (R. 8; 16; 364). Plaintiff did not accept Defendant City's offer. (R. 8). 
As a follow up to the January 3, 2006 Letter, the City Manager for Defendant City 
sent a letter, dated January 5, 2006, to Plaintiff informing him that Defendant City did not 
intend to renew his business license. (R. 10; 19; 369; 399; 795 at 156-157). The letter stated 
that a City Council meeting would be held on January 18, 2006 during which the non-
renewal of Plaintiff s business license would be formally taken. (R. 10; 19; 369; 399). 
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Defendant City's demand letter also repeated Defendant City's threats to criminally 
prosecute Plaintiff for each day of non-compliance, including a possible jail sentence of up to 
six (6) months and a possible fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) per violation. (R. 
10; 20; 370). Defendant City stated that it would report to the Motor Vehicle Enforcement 
Division that Plaintiffs business license had not been renewed. (R. 10; 20; 370). 
On the evening of January 18, 2006, Defendant City conducted a formal hearing to 
consider the revocation/non-renewal of Plaintiff s business license. (R. 399-400; 795 at 156-
157). Plaintiff was personally present and represented by his then legal counsel. (R. 400; 795 
at 156-157). Plaintiff was given the opportunity to present evidence and argument in support 
of his position. (R. 400; 795 at 156-157). At the conclusion of the hearing, Defendant City 
voted to revoke/not renew Plaintiffs business license. (R. 400; 795 at 158). During these 
proceedings, Defendant City also failed to give notice to Plaintiff concerning his right to 
appeal the revocation/non-renewal of his business license. Defendant City also failed to 
notify Plaintiff that any appeal must be made within thirty (30) days. 
Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant City inquiring as to what administrative appeals 
process was available to challenge the revocation of Plaintiff s business license. (R. 385). 
Defendant City failed to respond to that letter and no notice of any available appeals process 
was ever received. (R. 795 at 187). 
On Saturday, January 7, 2006, a police officer employed by Defendant City appeared 
at Plaintiffs business at the 95 State Property. (R. 10). The police officer informed one of 
Plaintiffs employees that he could not work at Plaintiffs business on Saturday and that he 
could only work, on a temporary basis, for Plaintiff during a regular forty-hour work week. 
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(R. 10). The police officer also notified Plaintiffs employee that Plaintiffs business would 
soon be shut down permanendy and that the employee would no longer be allowed to work 
there. (R. 10). 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint against Defendant City on January 18, 2006. (R. 
1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant City had attempted, by threatening civil and criminal 
prosecution, and by revoking/refusing to renew Plaintiffs conditional-use permits and 
business license, to coerce Plaintiff to sell his real property, and that such conduct 
constituted a taking by this municipality. (R. 11-13). Plaintiff also filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prohibit Defendant City from 
refusing to issue a business license to him. (R. 12-13). 
On January 18, 2006, Chief Lloyd Watkins of Defendant City's Police Department 
sent a letter to Plaintiff. (R. 372). In the letter, Chief Watkins advised Plaintiff that because 
his business license expired and that Plaintiff failed to obtain his business license renewed, 
Plaintiff was no longer allowed to conduct any business in Defendant City. (R. 372). The 
letter stated that the only allowable business on the 95 State Property was the physical 
removal of the motor vehicles. (R. 372). Chief Watkins also stated that any other activity on 
the premises would be considered doing business and that Plaintiff would be issued a citation 
for every day that this occurred. (R. 372). The January 18, 2006 Letter also indicated that 
since Plaintiff no longer had a business license, the vehicles on the 95 State Property were 
considered a nuisance under Defendant City ordinances. (R. 372). A Notice of Ordinance 
Violation was included with the January 18, 2006 Letter, notifying Plaintiff that he had been 
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cited for a Class C Misdemeanor for storing abandoned, discarded, or unused vehicles at the 
95 State Property and 160 State Property. (R. 373). 
On January 20, 2006, after allegedly observing Plaintiffs employees conducting 
business activities at the 95 State Property, police officers for Defendant City entered into 
Plaintiffs business at the 95 State Property and forcibly closed Plaintiffs business. (R. 45-
46). The police officers informed Plaintiffs employees that under the order of Defendant 
City, Plaintiffs employees could not remove any personal property or any of their tools from 
the 95 State Property. (R. 46). Since January 20, 2006, business operations at both of the 
subject properties, 95 State Property and 160 State Property, have remained closed. Plaintiff 
has lost an estimated hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) a month due to the closure of 
his business. (R. 795 at 189). 
On April 13, 2006, the District Court conducted a hearing on competing motions for 
a preliminary injunction, during which the District Court heard the oral argument and oral 
proffers of evidence of each party. (R. 766). Following the hearing, the District Court denied 
both Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction and 
Defendant City's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (R. 433). 
On October 26, 2006, Defendant City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
445). The Statement of Facts presented in Defendant City's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, cited only to facts presented in the 
District Court's Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the Preliminary Injunction 
hearing. (R. 446-453). Defendant City did not file any affidavits in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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On October 30, 2006, Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment was received 
at the law offices of Ascione, Heideman, & McKay, LLC, (hereinafter "Former Counsel"), 
the law firm formerly retained by Plaintiff, on October 30, 2006. (R. 652). However, in 
October of 2006, Former Counsel began moving its law office to a newly-acquired office 
space. (R. 648). The delivery of furniture and equipment necessary to complete the move 
was unavoidably and unpredictably delayed for a period of at least three (3) weeks. (R. 648) 
The move of Former Counsel's office was not completed until November 17, 2006. (R. 648). 
Former Counsel had also hired a new personal assistant on October 18, 2006. During the 
weeks required for the move of Former Counsel's office, both Former Counsel and staff 
were required to work either from home or from temporary desks within the law office. (R. 
648) Thus, when Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment arrived at Former 
Counsel on October 30, 2006, it was either misplaced or otherwise lost and not logged into 
the Former Counsel's document tracking system. (R. 652, 639). 
Due to these circumstances, Former Counsel did not receive copies of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment until the morning of November 20, 2006. (R. 648). Former 
Counsel immediately called counsel for Defendant City to explain the situation and to 
request an extension of time until the following day to file a Memorandum in Opposition. 
(R. 648). Defendant City's counsel informed Former Counsel that a Notice to Submit for 
Decision had already been filed on Defendant City's Motion on November 16, 2006. (R. 
649). Defendant City's counsel refused to withdraw the Notice to Submit, and refused to 
grant an extension of time for Former Counsel to file a Memorandum in Opposition. (R. 
649). On November 20, 2006, Former Counsel filed Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition. 
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(R. 473). On November 30, 2006, the District Court entered an Order Granting Motion For 
Summary Judgment to Defendant City. (R. 511-512). 
Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, along with a request for a hearing, on January 9, 2007. (R. 632). On 
January 23, 2007, a Notice of Substitution of Counsel was entered into the Court wherein 
Shawn T. Farris and Chad J. Udey of Farris & Udey, PC, were named as new counsel for 
Plaintiff. (R. 705). On February 6, 2007, Plaintiff submitted Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion to 
Set Aside Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for decision. (R.741). 
Plaintiffs Request to Submit for Decision also reiterated Plaintiffs request for a hearing on 
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside. (R. 741). 
On February 27, 2007, without holding a hearing on the motion, the District Court 
denied Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Order Granting Defendant City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 749). The order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside 
was entered into the Court on March 2, 2007 by way of a single page entided "Request to 
Submit Form and/or Order." (R. 749). The Order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside 
did not contain any Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or any written statement of the 
grounds for its decision. (R. 749). 
On March 20, 2007, Plaintiff filed a Request for Specific Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside. (R. 752). On June 28, 2007, the 
Court entered a Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order Granting Summary 
Judgment containing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment, which denies litigants the opportunity for trial, should be granted 
only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable probability that the party moved 
against could prevail. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant 
to deprive litigants of an opportunity to fully present their cases at trial. A motion for 
summary judgment should be granted only when the record before the court shows that 
there are no genuine issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
In the present case, the record clearly showed genuine issues of material facts. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate when a moving party's supporting documents show on 
their face genuine issues of material facts. The memorandum supporting Defendant City's 
motion for summary judgment showed the existence of genuine issues of material facts on its 
face; thus, Defendant City was improperly granted summary judgment. 
Summary judgment should be granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. In the present case, there is a reasonable possibility that Plaintiff would 
have prevailed at a trial on the merits. Also, the grounds upon which Defendant City relies 
upon for summary judgment do not, as a matter of law, entitle Defendant City to summary 
judgment. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from an preliminary injunction hearing do 
not have a binding, preclusive effect on a subsequent trial on the merits. (Centro de la 
Familia. 2004 UT 43, ^ f 4). In its Motion for Summary Judgment, and its accompanying 
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Memorandum in support, Defendant City improperly cited and relied upon the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law from an preliminary injunction hearing. 
When a motion for summary judgment is based on multiple grounds alleged by the 
moving party, the trial court should provide at least a brief written statement that allows the 
appellate court to determine the grounds upon which the trial court relied. In the present 
case, Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment alleged more than one theory. 
However, the District Court failed to provide any written statement that demonstrates upon 
which ground(s) the District Court relied in granting summary judgment. 
As a general rule, default judgments are not favored in the law and there is a 
preference in favor of setting aside the default. A default judgment may be set aside under 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when 1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a 
basis for granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged 
a meritorious defense. Here, all of these elements are satisfied; thus, the denial of Plaintiffs 
Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside was in error. 
Additionally, Plaintiff requested a hearing on his Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside. 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a request for a hearing on a motion should be 
granted when the motion would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action 
unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue 
has been authoritatively decided. (Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)). In the present case, Plaintiffs Rule 
60(b) Motion would have disposed of the action or any claim or defense in the action, and 
the motion was neither frivolous nor had any of the issues been authoritatively decided. The 
denial of Plaintiff s request for hearing on his Rule 60(b) Motion was in error. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS IN ERROR. 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). 
A. The granting of summary judgment was improper because there were genuine 
issues of material fact. 
Summary judgment is proper only if the relevant pleadings or evidentiary materials 
"show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." (Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). If there 
is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the non-moving party. (Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co.. 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
1984)). Thus, courts must evaluate all evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Id). 
On motion for summary judgment, doubts about whether the non-movant has established a 
genuine issue of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to 
trial. (Controlled Receivables. Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966)). 
1. The failure of Plaintiff to respond to Defendant City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is not a justifiable ground alone for granting 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant City. 
A party opposing summary judgment are not always required to proffer affidavits or 
other documents in order to avoid judgment against him. (Frisbee, at 390). In Frisbee. 
Plaintiff had brought an action to foreclose two trust deeds executed by the defendants. (Id. 
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at 389). The defendants counterclaimed and, as a third-party plaintiff, filed a complaint 
against a third-party defendant. (Id)- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, 
which was accompanied by an affidavit and a memorandum of points and authorities. Id 
Plaintiff and third-party defendant failed to respond and the trial court granted the 
defendants' motion. (Id). 
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Utah Supreme Court noted that it is 
not always necessary to submit documents in opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
in order to avoid judgment. (Id at 390). The Frisbee Court held that "where the party 
opposed to the motion submits no documents in opposition, the moving party may be 
granted summary judgment only if appropriate, that is, if he is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." (Id (quoting Orwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 596 (Utah 1982)). 
Similar to the plaintiffs and third-party defendant in Frisbee, in the present case 
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment. However, 
just as in Frisbee, Plaintiff did not need to file a respond to Defendant City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in order to avoid summary judgment because summary judgment was 
inappropriate. As discussed in more detail hereinafter, the record before the district court 
demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material facts which precluded Defendant 
City being granted summary judgment as a matter of law. 
2. The record before District Court demonstrated genuine issues of 
material fact; thus, the granting of summary judgment was improper. 
In the present case, summary judgment was improper because the depositions filed of 
record at the injunction hearing, Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, and other pieces of evidence 
22 
before the court demonstrated several genuine issues of material facts and controverted the 
facts set forth in Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Centro de la Familia 
de Utah v. Carter, 2004 UT 43, ^  5, 94 P.3d 261 ("[Ejvidence received upon an application 
for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes 
part of the trial record and need not be repeated at the trial." (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
65A(a)(2))); Nyman v. McDonald. 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah 1998) (holding that "one 
sworn statement, under oath and involving a material fact, such as deposition testimony, is all 
that is necessary to create an issue of fact, thereby precluding summary judgment"); 
Pentecost v. Harward. 699 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985) (holding that a verified pleading can be 
considered the equivalent of an affidavit for purposes of a motion for summary judgment); 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) ("it only takes one sworn statement 
under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue 
of fact.")). 
a. There is a genuine issue concerning the original intent and 
nature ofPlaintifPs conditional-use permit and business license 
for the 95 State Property. 
The record before the district court showed that there was a genuine issue of facts 
concerning the nature and type of business Plaintiff was operating on the 95 State Property. 
In addition to the repair of customer's cars, Plaintiffs intentions for and business operations 
at the 95 State Property included the acquisition, repair, and sale of wrecked vehicles owned 
by Plaintiff. (R. 2-4; 795 at 26-27,163-167). Plaintiff disclosed this information to 
Defendant City at the time that he first sought a conditional-use permit for the 95 State 
Property. Defendant City was aware of the nature of Plaintiff s business, and granted him a 
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conditional-use permit and business license to operate such a business. (R. 2; 793 at 15; 795 
at 163-167). 
In espousing contrary facts, Defendant City claimed that Plaintiffs business was 
strictly an auto repair shop-a shop used to repair cars brought in by customers- and did not 
include the acquisition, repair, and sale of wrecked cars purchased by Plaintiff. (R. 66; 70; 
112). Defendant City claimed that by participating in these actions, Plaintiff changed the 
scope and nature of his business, thus, Defendant City properly modified, revoked, and/or 
did not renew Plaintiffs conditional use permit and business license. (R. 344). 
Whether or not Defendant City improperly modified, revoked, and/or did not renew 
Plaintiffs conditional-use permit and business license is a genuine issue of material fact. 
According to the LaVerkin City Code, once granted, a conditional-use permit may only be 
revoked or modified if: (1) the permit was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud; (2) the 
specific use for which the permit was granted is not being exercised; or (3) noncompliance 
with conditions imposed upon said use permit. LaVerkin City Code §10-9-10. Since 
Plaintiffs original conditional-use permit included used car sales and allowed for Plaintiff to 
personally acquire, repair, and sale wrecked vehicles, Defendant City improperly modified 
and then revoked Plaintiffs conditional-use permit for the 95 State Property. Moreover, if 
Plaintiffs business was as he claims it to be, then when Defendant City changed the 
salvage/wrecking yard ordinance in 2004, Plaintiffs business and property would have met 
the criteria for a non-conforming but legal use. (R. 6, 346, 353). 
24 
b. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning Defendant 
City's position that Plaintiff was selling parts out of his business 
at the 95 State Property. 
Defendant City justified the modification, revocation, and/or non-renewal of 
Plaintiffs conditional-use permit and business license by claiming that Plaintiff was buying 
and selling parts out of his 95 State Property. Defendant City asserted that since Plaintiff 
was running a salvage/wrecking yard by buying and selling parts to third-party customers, he 
was no longer using the 95 State Property for the specific use for which his conditional-use 
permit was given. While Plaintiff does acknowledge that he was required to buy parts in 
order to reassemble and repair some of the wrecked vehicles, he disputes that, outside the 
times he acted as a parts broker, he ever sold parts to third-party buyers. (R. 388, 795 at 94-
96). Since Plaintiff was not selling parts to third-party customers and was not operating as a 
salvage/wrecking yard, the claims of Defendant City fail and any modification, revocation, 
and/or non-renewal of Plaintiff s conditional-use permit and business license for the 95 State 
Property was contrary to Defendant City's governing ordinances. Once again, whether or 
not Plaintiff was acting as a salvage /wrecking yard, thus making the actions of Defendant 
City proper, was a genuine issue of material fact 
c. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
Plaintiff had the right to appeal the modification of his 
conditional-use permit. 
The LaVerkin City Code specifically grants the right to appeal only "the decision to 
grant, grant with conditions, or deny a conditional use permit" LaVerkin City Code §10-9-
11. However, the LaVerkin City Code does not provide any means of due process by which 
one can effectuate an appeal of the modification of a conditional-use permit. Defendant City 
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does, however, issue a "Statement of Conditional Use Permit5' which states that "any person 
shall have the right to appeal any decision to grant, grant with conditions, deny, suspend, 
modify, or revoke a conditional use permit." (R. 795 at Exhibit 11 & 13). 
Plaintiff contends that his due process rights were violated, since Defendant City's 
governing ordinances do not provide for an appeal of a modification of a conditional-use 
permit (R. 12). Conversely, Defendant City asserts that the "Statement of Conditional Use 
Permit" gives a party the right and notice of the appeals process, and as such, Plaintiff failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies. (R. 466). Whether or not Plaintiff had the right and 
ability to appeal the modifications of his conditional-use permit is a genuine issue of material 
fact; thus, summary judgment was inappropriate. 
d. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
Plaintiff was given due process in regards to the revocation/'non-
renewal of his business license. 
Utah courts have noted that the licensing of a business represents such a substantial 
property interest to the owner that its should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor 
without following fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against capricious or 
oppressive administrative action. Andersen v. Utah County Bd. of County Commas. 589 
P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1979). Under Utah law, the due process clause guarantees that a party 
be given notice of his rights and any time limitations on these rights. Worrall v. Ogden City 
Fire Dep't 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). 
In Worrall the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant city had violated 
plaintiffs procedural due process rights when it failed to give written notice to plaintiff of his 
right to appeal the city's decision to terminate plaintiffs employment. Id. at 600-02. In 
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reaching this decision, the Worrall Court held that the lower court erred in holding that a 
Utah statute and defendant city's employee manual put plaintiff on notice of his right to 
appeal within five days of his termination. Id at 602. The Worrall Court stated that under 
the due process clause, that plaintiff was "entitled to have this essential information imparted 
to him; that he might make an intelligent and informed decision/' Id. The Worrall Court 
held that the letter discharging that plaintiff should have contained a notice of his right to a 
hearing and time limitation on this right. Id. 
In the present case, the failure of Defendant City to provide Plaintiff with notice 
concerning his right to appeal the revocation/non-renewal of the business license and the 
time limitation on this right is remarkably similar to the failures of the defendant city in 
Worrall. (R. 385). Moreover, in the instant case, Defendant City also failed and/or refused 
to respond to a reasonable inquiry from Plaintiff concerning his rights and procedures to 
appeal the revocation of his business license. (R. 795 at 187). 
Due to Defendant City's failure to notify Plaintiff of his right to an appeals hearing 
and the time limitation on this right, Plaintiff was not able to made an intelligent and 
informed decision. Just as the plaintiff in Worrall the due process rights of Plaintiff were 
violated and therefore, the summary judgment entered in favor of the Defendant City should 
be reversed. 
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e. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether 
Defendant City acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it 
modified Plaintiffs conditional-use permit and revoked/did not 
renew Plaintiffs conditional-use permit and business license. 
Pursuant to Utah law, courts acting as the appellate body reviewing a land-use 
decision rendered by a municipality is to presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
valid, and is to determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is 
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (UTAH CODE ANN. §10-9a-801(3)(a)). Whether or not 
Defendant City acted arbitrary, capriciously, or illegally is a genuine issue that should have 
been decided at a trial on the merits. 
f. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning what was the 
number and nature of the conditions purportedly placed upon 
PlaintifPs conditional-use permit for the 95 State Property. 
Defendant City asserts that it was within its rights to modify, revoke, and/or not 
renew Plaintiffs 95 State Property conditional-use permit and business license due to his 
alleged non-compliance with conditions placed thereon. (R. 122; 123; 128). There is a 
dispute concerning the number and nature of these conditions, which leads to a genuine 
issue of whether or not Plaintiff was non-compliant with these alleged conditions. 
Defendant City asserted that in a City Council meeting on December 15, 2004, 
Defendant City modified Plaintiffs 95 State Property conditional-use permit to include the 
condition that auto body work was only allowed on vehicles that had specific owners that 
were customers of Plaintiff s business. (R. 119-120). This condition would have essentially 
shut down Plaintiffs business. When Plaintiff did not allegedly comply with this new 
condition, Defendant City used Plaintiffs non-compliance as the basis for further 
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modification, revocation, and/or non-renewal of Plaintiff s conditional use permit and 
business license. (R. 121). 
However, Plaintiff contends that Defendant City never intended to place that specific 
condition (auto body work only) on the 95 State Property and that the Defendant City's 
Council had actually voted to eliminate that condition. (R. 795 at 132-37). If Plaintiff s 
contentions are correct, then Defendant City erred by using Plaintiffs alleged non-
compliance with this condition as a basis for modifying, revoking, and/or not renewing 
Plaintiffs 95 State Property conditional use permit and business license. 
3. The Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment demonstrated on its face genuine issues of material facts; 
thus, the granting of summary judgment was improper. 
Under Utah law, where the documents filed in support of a motion for summary 
judgment show on their face that there is a genuine issue of material facts, summary 
judgment is improper, even if responsive affidavits are not filed. Frisbee. 676 P.2d at 390. 
The Frisbee Court found that the defendant's affidavit and supporting documents presented 
"conclusions with no supporting facts and show unresolved issues of fact," so the grant of 
summary judgment in the defendant's favor was inappropriate. Id Similar to the supporting 
documents in Frisbee. Defendant City's Memorandum filed in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment set forth unresolved issues of material facts; therefore, summary 
judgment should not have been entered. 
29 
a. The Memorandum shows a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the original intent and nature of Plaintiffs 
conditional-use permit and business license for the 95 State 
Property. 
Defendant City's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment states that Plaintiff 
bought the 95 State Property with the "alleged intent to operate a business involving the 
acquisition, repair, and sale of damaged (salvaged) vehicles, and the repair of damaged 
vehicles owned by others." (R. 446). This Memorandum asserts that Plaintiff "allegedly 
disclosed his intended use of the 95 South State Property to members of the LaVerkin City 
Council" (R. 446). It is also stated that Plaintiff "requested preliminary conditional use 
approval for an auto body shop and used car dealership at 95 South State. (R. 447). The 
Memorandum notes that the Council initially granted preliminary approval of the projected 
business and later, gave Plaintiff a conditional-use permit and business license for "an auto 
body repair shop on the condition that sewer requirements are met." (R. 447). 
Later in the Memorandum, Defendant City asserts that at a Joint Work Meeting, the 
participants "indicated their understanding that [Plaintiff) had originally been given approval 
to use the [95 State Property] only for an auto body repair ship" and that the use of the 
"property to store and refurbish wrecked vehicles was unauthorized." (R. 448-449). 
As discussed above, the original intent and nature of Plaintiffs conditional-use permit 
and business license for the 95 State Property is disputed and is a genuine issue of material 
fact which should have been adjudicated, so the grant of summary judgment to the 
Defendant City was inappropriate. 
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b. The Memorandum shows a genuine issue of material fact 
concerning whether or not Defendant City had an interest in 
obtaining either of the Subject Properties. 
Defendant City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
attempts to demonstrate that it did not take Plaintiffs property by asserting that "[T]he City 
has now disavowed any interest in obtaining either of the Subject Properties" (R. 427). 
However, within the Memorandum, it is shown that Defendant City: (1) concluded that 
Defendant City's acquisition and ownership of the 95 State Property would resolve the on-
going concerns, (R. 421-422); (2) Defendant City spent thousands of dollars in taxpayer 
funds to obtain an appraisal for the 95 State Property, (R. 423); (3) Defendant City directed 
its legal counsel to draft a Commercial Real Estate Purchase Contract to acquire Plaintiffs 
property and make an offer for that property, (R. 423); and (4) Defendant City created a plan 
of coercion designed to force Plaintiff to accept that offer under the penalty of criminal and 
civil prosecution if Plaintiff did not accept the offer of purchase made by Defendant City 
within one (1) day. (R. 424). 
c. The Memorandum shows a genuine issue of material facts 
concerning whether or not Defendant City acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously. 
Defendant City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
asserts that the actions of Defendant City were not arbitrary or capricious, but at the same 
time, references the fact that Plaintiff claims that Defendant City did act arbitrarily and 
capriciously; a material disputed issue which is dependent upon material facts in dispute. 
As discussed above, whether or not Defendant City acted arbitrarily or capriciously is 
a genuine issue of material fact that made summary judgment improper. 
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B. The Granting of the Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment was in 
Error because the Defendant City was not entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, there is no reasonable possibility that he could prevail on his causes of 
action. Fnsbee, 676 P.2d at 389. 
1. Summary judgment was inappropriate because there is a reasonable 
possibility that Plaintiff would prevail on his inverse condemnation 
action. 
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." (Utah Const, art I, §22). Under 
Utah law, the takings analysis has two principal steps: (1) the claimant must demonstrate 
some protectable interest in the property and (2) the claimant must then show that the 
interest has been taken or damaged by government action." (View Condo. Owners Ass'n v. 
MSICO, LLC. 2005 UT 91, U 30, 127 P.3d 697). Additionally, under Utah law, any agency 
acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire under the eminent domain or 
condemnation law of this state must comply with certain policies. (UTAH CODE ANN.§ 57-
12-13). 
a. Plaintiff has a protectable interest in the Subject Properties. 
Utah courts have recognized that the term "property" denotes a broad range of 
interests. (Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Common, 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 
1982)). Moreover, the kinds of protectable property interests are practically unlimited. 
(Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d 1095,1098 (Utah 1995)). Under Utah law, Plaintiff had 
a protectable interest in operating and licensing his business at the 95 State Property and 160 
32 
State Property. (See Anderson. 589 P.2d at 1216 (holding that the licensing of a business 
represents a property interest, and should not be disrupted without following fundamental 
standards of due process of law)). 
b. The protectable interest of Plaintiff has been taken and/or 
damaged by the actions of Defendant City. 
A taking is "a substantial interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in any 
substantial degree abridged or destroyed." View, 2005 UT 91, |^ 30. 
In the present case, the revocation of Plaintiffs business license substantially 
interfered with Plaintiffs property rights and interests. Plaintiff is no longer able to operate 
his business and has experienced, and continues to suffer, loss of thousands of dollars due to 
the forcible closure of his business by Defendant City. (R. 795 at 189). Plaintiff not only lost 
a major source of income, but also lost a substantial sum of money which he invested in 
physical improvements to the 95 State Property and 160 State Property. (Id). After 
Defendant City revoked/did not renew Plaintiffs conditional use permit and business 
license, the economic viability of Plaintiff s properties was severely lessened. 
Additionally, the salvage/wrecking yard ordinance that was arbitrarily and capriciously 
enacted by Defendant City eliminated most, if not all, of the economic viability of Plaintiff s 
use of the Subject Properties to Plaintiff. Id. Defendant City's actions have definitely 
interfered substantially with Plaintiffs Subject Properties and has destroyed and/or 
materially lessened their value. 
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While the police power allows the government to regulate and restrain the use of 
private property when the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the public requires or demands 
it, none of these elements was present in the present case. (See Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990)). While Defendant City alleges that Plaintiff created a 
safety hazard when he parked cars along 100 South, this argument fails because Defendant 
City allowed cars to park along 100 South. (R. 343). Defendant City may have assumed that 
the parking would be for customers, and not for cars waiting to be repaired, but nonetheless, 
Defendant City still allowed cars to park along 100 South. (Id.) Additionally, while the cars 
were not pleasing to the eye, an unpleasant looking automobile does not create a health, 
safety, moral, or welfare hazard to a community. 
c. Defendant City failed to comply with the established procedure 
for acquiring property under the eminent domain or 
condemnation laws of this state. 
Under Utah law, any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to 
acquire under the eminent domain or condemnation law of this state must comply with 
certain policies. (UTAH CODE ANN. §57-12-13). Pertinent to the present case, the agency 
acquiring real property must comply with the following: (1) every reasonable effort shall be 
made to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation; (2) real property shall be 
appraised before the initiation of negotiations; (3) before the initiation of negotiations, an 
amount shall be established which is reasonably believed to be just compensation, and such 
amount shall be offered for the property; (4) in no event shall the time of condemnation be 
advanced, on negotiations and the deposit of funds in court for the use of the owner be 
deferred, or any coercive action be taken to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for 
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the property; and (3) if an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the power 
of eminent domain, formal condemnation proceedings shall be instituted and the acquiring 
agency shall not make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the 
fact of the taking of this real property. (Id). 
There is no question that Defendant City wanted to secure ownership of the 95 State 
Property in order to widen the adjacent road and make it into the new city maintenance 
shop. (R. 8, 16, 363-364, 366-367). Under the eminent domain or condemnation laws of 
this state, Defendant City may have had the right to take Plaintiffs private property for 
public use. However, Defendant City failed to take the appropriate and legal route to this 
end. Instead, Defendant City plotted a plan of coercion and intimidation to accomplish its 
acquisition of Plaintiff s Property. (Id)-
Defendant City did not attempt to exhaust every reasonable effort to acquire 
Plaintiffs real property through negotiation. Defendant City sent a single letter, which 
demanded Plaintiff sell his real property to Defendant City and gave Plaintiff a deadline of 
one day to respond to Defendant City's offer, after which the offer would expire. (R. 8; 16; 
363-364). Defendant City also refused the reasonable offer from Plaintiff to timely wind 
down his business, after which, he would agree to sell the 95 State Property to the Defendant 
City. (R. 7). Defendant City threatened civil and criminal proceedings if Plaintiff refused to 
sell his Real Property to the Defendant City. (R. 8-9, 16, 363-364). 
Defendant City also failed to initiate the requisite formal condemnation proceedings. 
By doing so, Plaintiff was forced to exactly that which the statute was designed to prevent, 
namely, institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property 
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interests by Defendant City. Defendant City also failed to obtain an appraisal or make an 
offer for the property prior to initiating negotiations as required by Utah statute.2 
Most importantly, Defendant City completely disregarded Utah law which expressly 
prohibits "coercive action . . . to compel an agreement on the price to be paid for the 
property. The December 20, 2005 letter is replete with multiple threats of prosecution and 
other coercive measures. (R. 8; 9; 16; 363). As noted in the Statement of the Case, the 
January 3, 2006 Letter sent by Defendant City stated that if Plaintiff chose not to accept 
Defendant City's offer, Defendant City would retaliate with specific actions designed to close 
down Plaintiffs business. (Id). 
When Plaintiff refused to accept this offer, a follow-up letter was sent that reiterated 
the previous threats. (R. 10; 20; 370). Moreover, the follow-up letter also contained several 
new threats, including the threats to not renew Plaintiffs business license and to provide a 
negative report to Utah's Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division. (Id). 
In furtherance of its efforts, Defendant City also sent law enforcement of Defendant 
City direcdy to Plaintiffs property to tell Plaintiffs employee that he could not, for some 
unexplained reason, work at Plaintiffs business on a Saturday and that Plaintiffs business 
would soon be shut down permanendy. (R. 10). Defendant City followed up on this threat, 
by physically entering the 95 State Property and forcibly shutting down Plaintiffs business. 
(R. 10). These actions were designed and implemented in order to coerce and intimidate 
Plaintiff into selling his real property to Defendant City. 
2
 Appraisal is dated 1246-05. Negotiations began in May 2005. (R. 7; 795 at 140-141): 
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Defendant City essentially ignored the policies articulated in UCA §57-12-13. 
Defendant City did not make every reasonable effort to acquire Plaintiffs property through 
negotiation, but instead attempted to coerce, intimidate, and bully Plaintiff into selling 
Defendant City his property. (R. 8, 16, 363-364, 366-367). The judicial system should not 
have awarded, nor continue to award, Defendant City for this type of behavior. The grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant City should be reversed and this case should be 
allowed to proceed to a trial on the merits. 
2. Defendant City did not have an established appeals process for the 
modification of a conditional-use permit; thus, summary judgment 
could not have been granted based on Defendant City's argument that 
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
As discussed above, Defendant City did not have an established appeals process for 
the modification of a conditional-use permit. Pursuant to UCA §10-9a-801(l), no person 
can challenge in the district court a municipality's land use decision until that person has 
exhausted the person's administrative remedies if applicable. (Emphasis added). Plaintiff did 
not have an administrative remedy available to appeal the modification of his conditional use 
permit. Thus, UCA §10-9a-801(l) is inapplicable in the present case. Defendant City's 
argument that summary judgment was proper because Plaintiff did not exhaust all of his 
administrative remedies fails. As such, Defendant City failed to show that it was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
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C. The grant of summary judgment should be reversed because Defendant City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and its accompanying Memorandum in 
support inappropriately relied on the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
from an injunction hearing. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law from an injunction hearing do not have a 
binding, preclusive effect on a subsequent trial on the merits. (Centro de la Familia, 2004 UT 
43, If 4). In Centro, the Court corrected the erroneous assumption of the parties that the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law from an earlier preliminary injunction hearing would 
have a binding, preclusive effect on their forthcoming trial on the merits. (Id)- The Centro 
Court held that Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for evidence received 
at an injunction hearing to become a part of the trial record, but that the rule speaks only to 
the presentation of evidence and "does not direct that findings and conclusions relating to an 
injunction are binding in a subsequent trial on the merits." (IdL at ^ J5). 
Defendant City's incorrecdy relied on the district court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law regarding the parties' motions for preliminary injunction. In the 
Statement of Facts presented in Defendant City's Memorandum in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Defendant City essentially quotes verbatim from the findings of fact 
issued by the court following the preliminary injunction hearing. (R. 446-453). Defendant 
City asserted that the statement of facts contained the material facts as found by the court in 
the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendant City also erroneously relies on 
the findings of fact from the injunction hearing in an attempt to demonstrate that specific 
issues had already been adjudicated (i.e. "This Court has made specific findings concerning 
both the 95 South State CUP and the 160 South State CUP, showing Stevens failed to 
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exhaust his administrative remedies" (R. 458) and "[a]s previously established by the Court in 
its Findings of Facts, both of [Plaintiffs] [conditional use permits] were revoked and 
[Plaintiff] have failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing those actions 
to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustments within 30 days" (R. 461). Apparendy, Defendant City 
made the same erroneous assumption as the parties in Centra- that the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law from the preliminary injunction hearing were binding on a subsequent 
action. The granting of summary judgment should not be premised on the determination of 
a preliminary injunction hearing. As such, the lower court erred in granting summary 
judgment based on such erroneous assumptions and a flawed Memorandum in support of 
summary judgment 
D. The grant of summary judgment should be reversed because the order 
granting summary judgment did not contain an adequate written statement of 
grounds or basis upon which summary judgment was granted. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court need not enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions. (Utah R. Civ. P. 52). However, the district 
court shall issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when the motion is based on 
more than one ground. (Id)- Failure of a trial court to give a written statement of grounds 
for its order granting summary judgment, where the motion for summary judgment was 
based on more than one ground, can be a reversible error in some circumstances. 
(Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States. Inc.. 844 P.2d 949, 958 n.4 
(Utah 1992); Masters v. Worsley. 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1989)). 
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The brief written statement must allow the appellate court to determine which of the 
grounds a trial court relied upon in making its ruling. (Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 
UT App 277,120, 34 P.3d 234). In Gabriel plaintiffs sued the City of Salt Lake claiming 
that one of the defendant's police officers negligendy struck and killed Plaintiffs' son while 
driving a city-owned vehicle. (Id. at 1fl|2-7). The defendant city moved for summary 
judgment asserting three different arguments in its memorandum supporting summary 
judgment. (Id at [^6). The trial court stated that it granted summary judgment to the 
defendant "for the reasons set forth in the [prevailing party's] memorandum supporting its 
motion."(IcLat1f7). 
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that 
"the presumption of correctness ordinarily afforded trial court rulings has litde operative 
effect when we cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic nature of its 
ruling." (Id at ^|10). Because the Gabriel Court could not determine on which ground 
advanced by the defendant city in its motion for summary judgment the trial court relied in 
making its decision, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
city was reversed. (Id at 1J20). 
Just as the defendants in Gabriel Defendant City asserted multiple arguments in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 454-467). Similar to the district court's order in Gabriel 
the only statement included in the District Court's Order which granted summary judgment 
to Defendant City indicated that judgment was granted, "[b]ased on [the] Defendant City of 
LaVerkin's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Robert C. Stevens and the 
Memorandum in Support of said Motion, and good cause appearing." (R. 511). 
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Utah courts have specifically disagreed with the practice employed by the lower court 
in the present case. (See Russell/Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, n. 6, 78 
P.3d 616). The District Court failed to "explain the basis of their decisions when there are 
multiple issues before the court." (Id). 
While Rule 52(a) does allow for brevity in such statements, the brief written statement 
should still inform the parties about the mind of the court and the analysis used to resolve 
the dispute. (Masters, 777 P.2d at 501). In addition, a written statement should provide a 
basis on which the appellate court can review the judgment. (Id). The statement issued by 
the lower court fails to satisfy any of these purposes. Inasmuch as the District Court did not 
provide an adequate written statement, it is unknown which facts were accepted by the 
District Court and on what basis the District Court relied in holding that, as a matter of law, 
the Defendant City was entitled to summary judgment. The written statement entered in the 
present case fails to provide the parties any insight into the mind of the District Court or the 
analysis used to resolve the dispute. The parties are left to speculate and guess as to which of 
the arguments proffered by the Defendant City formed the basis for the granting of summary 
judgment to Defendant City and against Plaintiff. Additionally, the effectiveness of the 
appellate court is hampered by the failure of the lower court to provide a written statement 
that provides a basis for which a review of the judgment could be made. Given the failures 
of the written statement of the District Court to satisfy any of the purposes for which the 
brief written statement was designed, the grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
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II THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S RULE 
60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT 
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable rule designed to 
balance competing interests of finality and fairness. (Menzies v. Galetka. 2006 UT 81, ^[63, 
150 P.3d 480; see Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, Tf 10, 11 P.3d 277). Utah law recognizes that 
district courts have broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion because of the equitable 
nature of the rule, and that the rule should be applied liberally. (Menzies, 2006 UT 81, |^63 
(citing Lund, 2000 UT 75, ffif 9-10)). Judgment by default is an "extreme measure and a case 
should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits." (Id at [^63 (quoting Cmty. Dental 
Servs. v. Tani 282 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Or. 2002)); see also State v. Musselman, 667 
P.2d 1053,1055 (Utah 1983)). Thus, courts "should be generally indulgent toward vacating 
default judgments and must incline towards granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that 
the party may have a hearing." (Menzies at T|63). In the present case, the District Court did 
not exercise its broad discretionary powers with liberality, nor did the court balance the 
equities of the case with a strong inclination towards allowing Plaintiff to have his day in 
court. 
A. Plaintiff satisfied the established three-prong test; thus the denial of Plaintiffs 
Rule 60(b) Motion was incorrect. 
Under Utah law, a movant is entided to have a default judgment set aside under 60(b) 
if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for granting relief under one of the subsections 
of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a meritorious defense. (Id. at ^64). 
1. Plaintiffs 60(a) motion was filed in a timely manner. 
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A motion under 60(b) must be filed within a reasonable time, and in cases where 
subsection (b)(1) applies, the motion must be filed "no more than 3 months after the 
judgment. . . was entered." (Utah R. Civ. 60(b)). The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendant on or around November 30, 2006, and Plaintiff filed his 
motion to set aside the judgment on January 9, 2007. (R. 632). Thus, the Plaintiffs 60(b) 
Motion was timely filed. (Utah R. Civ. 60(b)). 
2. The District Court erred in holding that Plaintiff failed to show there 
was a basis for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1). 
A party may obtain relief from a judgment if he can demonstrate "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect/' (Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)). Excusable neglect as 
been defined as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances." (Mini Spas, Inc. v. Indus. Common. 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987)). 
In the present case, Former Counsel of Plaintiff exercised due diligence and but for 
circumstances beyond his control, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant 
City's Motion for Summary Judgment would have been timely filed. Former Counsel of 
Plaintiff exercised due diligence by developing and implementing standard procedures 
regarding incoming pleadings. (R. 639). These standard procedures were designed to prevent 
the missing of deadlines in motion practice. Standard procedures such as the ones developed 
and implemented by Former Counsel are common to law firms. 
Nevertheless, an oversight occurred and a clerical mistake was made in the application 
of firm protocol for incoming documents during the relocation of the Former Counsel. (R. 
652; 639). This type of clerical mistake may be cured under Rule 60(b)(1). (See Fisher v. 
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Bybee. 2004 UT 92,% 9, 104 P.3d 1198 (holding that Rule 60(b)(1) was proper to remedy a 
clerical mistake)). As a result of hiring a new secretary, who was not completely familiar with 
firm protocol, the standard procedure for incoming documents was not followed. (R. 652; 
639). Combine this clerical mistake with the stress, chaos, and confusion inherent in the 
remodel and relocation of offices, it is possible that an attorney would not receive a properly 
calendered document regardless of resources and the number of personnel. Plaintiffs failure 
to timely respond was not for failure to exercise due diligence, but because of an inadvertent 
and unintentional mistake on the part of Former Counsel Therefore, under the mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect standard of rule 60(b)(1), the Order Granting 
Summary Judgment should have been set aside. 
3. The District Court erred in holding that Plaintiff failed to show there 
was basis for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
When an attorney willfully disregards a client's interests, acts in a grossly negligent 
fashion, or renders ineffective assistance of counsel, Rule 60(b)(6) is applicable, and an 
unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of a default judgment resulting from 
an attorney's grossly negligent conduct. (See, e.g.. Menzies, 2006 UT 81, %/l; Shepard Claims 
Serv.. Inc. v. William Darrah & Assocs.. 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[Ajlthough a 
party who chooses an attorney takes the risk of suffering from the attorney's incompetence, 
we do not believe . . . a client should suffer the ultimate sanction of losing his case without 
any consideration of the merits because of his attorney's neglect and inattention."); L.P. 
Steuart. Inc. v. Matthews. 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that the client was 
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entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), because the case defaulted as a result of the counsel's 
gross negligence and misleading of the client)). 
In Menzies, the plaintiff, a death row inmate, appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside. (Menzies at 1flfl-2). ^n reversing the ruling, the Menzies Court noted 
that plaintiffs attorney repeatedly failed to comply with straightforward procedural 
requirements and court-ordered deadlines. (Jd at 1fl05). Plaintiffs attorney took no action 
to build Plaintiffs case and allowed the State to obtain a default judgment by failing to 
respond to discovery. (Id). Plaintiffs attorney also mislead the client about the procedural 
posture of the case, the result being that the client was not fully aware of the attorney's 
failures until after they occurred. (Id). The client was not notified of the reason for the 
default, and when he was informed of the default, his attorney assured the client that he was 
taking steps to have it set aside and the client detrimentally relied on this representation. The 
Menzies Court held that the attorney's conduct clearly constituted gross negligence, and that 
Plaintiff was entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6). (Id). 
The Menzies Court referenced approvingly to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
holding in Tani wherein the defendant's counsel repeated failed to do such things as file a 
timely memorandum in opposition to a motion for default judgment and provide opposing 
counsel with a copy of the answer. (Tani, 282 F.3d at 1166). Because of counsel's 
negligence, the district court entered a default judgment against the defendant. (Id). 
Defendant's counsel also represented to his client that the case was proceeding smoothly. Id. 
It was not until the order of default judgment was mailed to the defendant's office that he 
became aware of his counsel's failures. (Id). In reversing the district court's denial of the 
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defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that where "an 
attorney engages in grossly negligent conduct resulting in [default judgment], the client merits 
relief under Rule 60(b)(6), and may not beheld acountable for his attorney's misconduct." 
(TA at 1172). 
In the present case, the actions of Former Counsel are similar to the actions of the 
attorneys in Menzies and Tani. Former Counsel failed to notify Plaintiff of the pending 
Motion for Summary Judgment and failed to respond to the Motion in a timely manner. 
Due to the District Court's failure to grant Plaintiff a hearing on his Rule 60(b) motion, the 
record does not accurately reflect the true nature of Former Counsel's negligence. Had 
Plaintiffs request for a hearing on his Rule 60(b) motion been held, Plaintiff would have 
testified that his Former Counsel failed to inform him of the pending Motion for Summary 
Judgment; failed to respond to Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment in a timely 
manner; and failed to notify Plaintiff that summary judgment had been granted, but that 
Plaintiff discovered this on his own. Plaintiff discovered that summary judgment had been 
granted, Plaintiffs Former Counsel mislead Plaintiff by stating that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment had never been mailed to counsel and that the Motion didn't even contain a 
mailing certificate. Former Counsel did not properly communicate with Plaintiff and that all 
information received from Former Counsel was vague and confusing to Plaintiff. In sum, 
Former Counsel was grossly negligent in the handling of Plaintiff s case and mislead Plaintiff 
about the progress and status of Plaintiffs case. 
While an attorney's negligent acts are ordinarily chargeable to the client, a client 
should not be held liable for the attorney's actions where those actions are grossly negligent 
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(Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^ [104 (quoting Tani 282 R3d at 1168-69)). If the judicial system were 
to hold an uninformed client liable in such a case, the judicial system would lose credibility, 
as well as the appearance of fairness, if the innocent party is forced to suffer the drastic 
consequence of a default judgment (Tani 282 F.3d at 1170). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 
constitutes a mechanism by which a party can receive an actual and full relief from his 
formerly retained counsel's gross negligence- an opportunity to present his case on the 
merits. Based on the principles articulated above, the ruling of the lower court denying 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Judgment should be reversed. 
4. Plaintiff alleged a meritorious defense. 
As stated above, the purposes of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to assure that 
disputes are decided on the merits whenever possible. "A meritorious defense is one which 
sets forth specific and sufficiendy detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a 
judgment different from the one entered." (Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1055-56). As discussed 
above, if the court were to have decided the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the merits of the case, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment would have failed due 
to the presence of existing material facts which were genuinely disputed and the defenses 
raised and alleged by Plaintiff. 
B. Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion was denied without affording Plaintiff the 
hearing he had requested pursuant to URCP Rule 7. 
In the present case, Plaintiff requested a hearing on his Rule 60(b) Motion to Set 
Aside the Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 632). The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that courts "shall grant a request for a hearing on . . . 
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a motion that would dispose of the action of any claim or defense in the action unless the 
court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been 
authoritatively decided." (Utah R. Civ. P. 7(e)). 
Pursuant to Rule 7, Plaintiffs request for a hearing should have been granted. (Id). 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion would have disposed of the action or any claim or defense in 
the action. The motion was not frivolous, as Plaintiff had a good faith argument that the 
Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant City should be set aside pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the relevant arguments and issues 
addressed in Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion had not been authoritatively decided. In as much 
as Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion satisfies the Rule 7(e) requirements there was no reasonable 
basis for the denial of Plaintiff s Rule 60(b) Motion without providing Plaintiff the hearing he 
had requested pursuant to Rule 7. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and in the interests of justice, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that the Order Granting Defendant City's Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Order 
Dismissing Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment be reversed. 
DATED this _<*?day of August, 2007. 
ChadJ.Utley 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
§ Rule 7 
Utah Rules 
RULES.OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part III Pleadings. Motions, and Orders 
Rule 7 Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a counterclaim; an answer to a cross claim, if the 
answer contains a cross claim; a third party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned under 
the provisions of Rule 14; and a third party answer, if a third party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be 
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third party answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial 
or in proceedings before a court commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in writing 
and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be 
accompanied by a supporting memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, 
a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum 
in opposition, the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in 
the memorandum in opposition. No other memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument without leave of the court. Reply 
memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as 
to which the moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set forth in the moving 
party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of 
the moving party's facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For 
each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide, an explanation of the grounds for 
any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional 
facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by 
citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain a table of contents and a table of 
authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions of documents cited in the 
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memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party may file a "Request to Submit for 
Decision." The request to submit for decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. If no party files a request, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may request a hearing in the motion, in a 
memorandum or in the request to submit for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a 
motion that would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing, not included in a 
judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except as 
otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the adverse party may be vacated or modified by 
the judge who made it with or without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion 
or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise 
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within 
five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection 
or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as separate documents and shall not 
incorporate any matter by reference. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of a court commissioner is the order of 
the court until modified by the court. A party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made in open court or, if the court commissioner 
takes the matter under advisement, ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The practice for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain whether 
the judge wants a courtesy copy of that party's motion, memoranda and supporting documents and, if so, when and 
where to deliver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just orders upon motion. 
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§ Rule 52 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PEOCEDURE 
Part VI Trials 
Rule 52 Findings by the court. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 A; in 
granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear 
in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend 
its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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§ Rule 56 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part VII Judgment 
Rule 56 Summary judgment. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case 
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the 
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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§ Rule 60 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part VllJudgment 
Rule 60 Relief from judgment or order. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party 
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months 
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
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§ Rule 65A 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part VIII Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings 
Rule 65A Injunctions. 
Rule 65A. Injunctions. 
(a) Preliminary injunctions. 
(1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party. 
(2) Consolidation of hearing. Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary 
injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of 
the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a 
preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial on the merits becomes part of the trial record and need 
not be repeated at the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties any rights 
they may have to trial by jury. 
(b) Temporary restraining orders. 
(1) Notice. No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party or that party's 
attorney unless (A) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate 
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can 
be heard in opposition, and (B) the applicant or the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing as to the efforts, 
if any, that have been made to give notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be required. 
(2) Form of order. Every temporary restraining order shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance and shall 
be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and entered of record. The order shall define the injury and state why it is 
irreparable. The order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, 
unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the party against 
whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension shall be 
entered of record. 
(3) Priority of hearing. If a temporary restraining order is granted, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be 
scheduled for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over all other civil matters except older matters 
of the same character. When the motion comes on for hearing, the party who obtained the temporary restraining order 
shall have the burden to show entitlement to a preliminary injunction; if the party does not do so, the court shall 
dissolve the temporary restraining order. 
(4) Dissolution or modification. On two days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order 
without notice, or on such shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and 
move its dissolution or modification. In that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as 
expeditiously as the ends of justice, require. 
(c) Security. 
(1) Requirement. The court shall condition issuance of the order or injunction on the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum and form as the court deems proper, unless it appears that none of the parties will incur or suffer 
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Paragraph (a). Subparagraph (a)(1) is identical to paragraph (a) of the former rule. It is also identical to the 
corresponding subparagraph in Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subparagraph (a)(2) is entirely new to the 
Utah rules. It is borrowed from subparagraph (a)(2) of the federal rule. It allows the court, in its discretion, to 
adjudicate the entire case at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing. If the court decides not to consolidate the 
trial on the merits with the preliminary injunction hearing, admissible evidence received at the preliminary injunction 
hearing nevertheless becomes part of the trial record and need not be introduced again. 
Paragraph (b) This paragraph is similar to paragraph (b) of the former rule. It has been reorganized for clarity and 
has been modernized in other respects Subparagraph (1) prohibits the issuance of a temporary restraining order unless 
two conditions are met. First, as in the former rule, the record must disclose that irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 
result if the court does not intervene. Second, the applicant or the applicant's attorney must provide written certification 
of any effort to give notice and the reasons for which notice should not be required. The latter requirement is new. The 
language in subparagraphs (3) and (4) has been modernized and clarified. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has been revised to reflect developments in the case law and a new rule in this state 
on damages for wrongfully issued injunctions. Subparagraph (1) makes it clear that the court may decline to require 
security if it appears that none of the parties will suffer expense or damages from a wrongful temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction, or if, in the particular case, there is some other substantial reason for dispensing with 
the requirement of security. See Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wallace, 
573 P.2d 1285, 1286-87 (Utah 1978) Otherwise, the court should require security in an appropriate amount. 
Subparagraph (2), which is new, makes it clear that the amount of the security required by the court does not limit the 
recovery that may be awarded to a wrongfully restrained party. This provision represents 
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10-9-10: MODIFICATION OR REVOCATION: 
The city council may modify or revoke a conditional use permit, following notice and a hearing. A conditional 
use permit may be modified or revoked if the city council finds one or more of the following: 
A. The permit was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, 
B. The specific use for which the permit was granted is not being exercised; or 
C. Noncompliance with conditions imposed upon said use permit. (Ord. 2004-12, 5-19-2004) 
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10-9-11: APPEAL OF DECISION: 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision to grant, grant with conditions or deny a conditional 
use permit. Such appeal shall be made to the board of adjustment. 
Any person or entity desiring a special exception may apply to the board of adjustment in the terms of this 
title as applied to zoning districts; providing a landowner relief in extraordinary cases where the board of 
adjustment finds the existing special fact and circumstances specified therein as sufficient to warrant a 
diversion from the general rule. Special exceptions are not to be granted liberally. (Ord. 2004-12, 5-19-2004) 
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10-9a-801 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 10 - Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 09a - Municipal Land Use. Development, and Management 
10-9a-801 No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted - Time for filing - Tolling of time -
Standards governing court review - Record on review -- Staying of decision. 
10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted -- Time for filing -- Tolling of time — 
Standards governing court review — Record on review - Staying of decision. 
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under a 
regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as 
provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable. 
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of 
this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days after the local land use 
decision is final. 
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner files a request for 
arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30 days 
after: 
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or 
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 13-43-204(3)(b) declining to 
arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator. 
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue that is the subject 
of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by a property owner. 
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to file 
a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition. 
(3) (a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably 
debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation'promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal. 
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, 
statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted. 
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes final action on a land 
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use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality conformed with the notice provisions of Part 
2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending decision. 
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land use ordinance 
or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the enactment. 
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision is final. 
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing court the 
record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its 
proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct transcript for 
purposes of this Subsection (7). 
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land use authority or 
appeal authority, as the case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use authority or appeal 
authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, 
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority appeal authority, as 
the case may be. 
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking 
issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal authority to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed pending district court 
review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality. 
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking 
issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an injunction staying the appeal authority's decision. 
Amended by Chapter 306, 2007 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 363, 2007 General Session 
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57-12-13 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 57- Real Estate 
Chapter 12 - Utah Relocation Assistance Act 
57-12-13 Procedure for acquisition of property. 
57-12-13. Procedure for acquisition of property. 
Any agency acquiring real property as to which it has the power to acquire under the eminent domain or 
condemnation laws of this state shall comply with the following policies: 
(1) Every reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation. 
(2) Real property shall be appraised before the initiation of negotiations, and the owner or his designated 
representative shall be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser during his inspection of the property. 
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, an amount shall be established which is reasonably 
believed to be just compensation therefor, and such amount shall be offered for the property. In no event shall such 
amount be less than the lowest approved appraisal of the fair market value of the property. Any decrease or increase of 
the fair market value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for which such 
property is acquired or by the likelihood that the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that due 
to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner, will be disregarded in determining the 
compensation for the property. The owner of the real property to be acquired shall be provided with a written statement 
of, and summary of the basis for, the amount established as just compensation. Where appropriate the just 
compensation for real property acquired and for damages to remaining real property shall be separately stated. 
(4) No owner shall be required to surrender possession of real property acquired through federal or federally 
assisted programs before the agreed purchase price is paid or there is deposited with a court having jurisdiction of 
condemnation of such property, in accordance with applicable law, for the benefit of the owner an amount not less than 
the lowest approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property or the amount of the award of compensation in 
the condemnation proceeding of such property. 
(5) The construction or development of a public improvement shall be so scheduled that, to the greatest extent 
practicable, no person lawfully occupying real property shall be required to move from a dwelling (assuming a 
replacement dwelling will be available) or to move his business or farm operation without at least 90 days' written 
notice from the date by which such move is required. 
(6) If an owner or tenant is permitted to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term or for a 
period subject to termination on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair rental value of the 
property to a short-term occupier. 
(7) In no event shall the time of condemnation be advanced, on negotiations or condemnation and the deposit of 
funds in court for the use of the owner be deferred, or any other coercive action be taken to compel an agreement on the 
price to be paid for the property. 
(8) If an interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the power of eminent domain, formal 
condemnation proceedings shall be instituted. The acquiring agency shall not intentionally make it necessary for an 
owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property. 
http://66.161.141.175/cgi-bin/texis/web/utstat/+PwwBmeC82Set73xwwxFqHmqmv88vqW_vnshhqq6sn+... 8/8/2007 
(9) If the acquisition of only part of the property would leave its owner with an uneconomic remnant, an offer to 
acquire the entire property shall be made. 
Enacted by Chapter 24, 1972 General Session 
Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved. 
The Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is provided for 
use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement to which all users 
assent in order to access the database. 
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72-7-202 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 72 - Transportation Code 
Chapter 07 - Protection of Highways Act 
72-7-202 Definitions. 
72-7-202. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Automobile graveyard" means any establishment or place of business which is maintained, 
used, or operated for storing, keeping, buying, or selling wrecked, scrapped, ruined, or dismantled motor 
vehicles or motor vehicle parts. 
(2) "Junk" means old or scrap copper, brass, rope, rags, batteries, plastic, paper, trash, rubber, waste, 
junked, dismantled, or wrecked automobiles or their parts, and iron, steel, and other old or scrap ferrous 
or nonferrous material. 
(3) "Junkyard" means any place, establishment, or business maintained, used, or operated for storing, 
keeping, buying, or selling junk, or for the maintenance or operation of an automobile graveyard. 
Junkyard includes a salvage yard, war surplus yard, garbage dump, recycling facility, garbage 
piocessing facility, and sanitary land fill. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 270, 1998 General Session 
Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved. 
The Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is 
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license 
agreement to which all users assent in order to access the database. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT* JN-ANB-? OK" 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF LAVERKIN, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 060500154 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
On January 18, 2006, the plaintiff, Robert C. Stevens ("Stevens"), filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, and a memorandum in support of the 
motion. Believing that the motion had been submitted ex parte, the Court entered an order 
denying it on February 1, 2006. On February 3, 2006, the defendant, the City of LaVerkin, Utah 
("the City"), filed a memorandum in opposition to Stevens's motion and in support of its own 
cross-motion for a preliminary injunction. On February 10, 2006, Stevens filed a reply 
memorandum in support of his motion.1 On February 23, 2006, Stevens filed a memorandum in 
1
 Stevens filed his reply memorandum by fax. The bottom center of the first page of 
Stevens's reply reads, "Page 1 of 7," but, presumably due to a technical problem, only the first 
page is complete. The second page ends abruptly in the middle of the first sentence on that page. 
No other pages are included in the Court's file. A partial reply of this kind is little better than no 
opposition to the City's motion. On March 8, 2006, the City filed a reply memorandum. On 
April 13, 2006, the Court conducted a hearing on the competing motions. The Court heard the 
oral argument and proffers of evidence of each party, as presented by and through counsel. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law by May 1, 2006. On May 1, 2006, Stevens submitted a lengthy 
supplemental memorandum in support of his proposed findings and conclusions. On May 2, 
2006, the City submitted a supplemental memorandum in support of the findings and conclusions 
it proposed. Having reviewed the parties' memoranda and the relevant law, the Court now enters 
its findings of fact2 and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
reply at all. See Mcintosh v. Antonino, 71 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1995) (where fax transmission 
was incomplete, "half a complaint — particularly an unsigned half that does not even contain a 
demand for judgment — is no better than none"). However, Stevens subsequently filed a 
supplemental memorandum that not only duplicates many of the arguments made in the initial 
memorandum filed in support of his motion, but also adds extensively thereto. Stevens also 
participated, through counsel, in oral argument at a hearing on the competing motions. It 
therefore seems unlikely that any important arguments made in the unfiled portion of his reply 
have not been presented to the Court. 
2
 Because the Court has not had a chance to hear the live testimony of witnesses, but has 
been confined to hearing evidence proffered by the parties' respective counsel, and to reading the 
cold transcripts of deposition testimony, the Court's fact-finding ability is significantly 
hampered. See State v. Horn 221 P. 867, 878 (Utah 1923) (Cherry, J., dissenting) ("Truth does 
not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract[.]'") (quoting 
Creamer v. Bivert 113 S.W. 1118, 1120 (Mo. 1908)). Consistent with the will of the parties, 
however, the facts presented here are drawn from either the undisputed facts of the parties' 
memoranda and exhibits, or from apparently uncontroverted deposition testimony. 
2 
1. In late 1998 or early 1999, Stevens purchased property located at 95 South State Street 
(uthe 95 South State Property") in LaVerkin, Utah. Stevens Dep. at 24 and 65. At the time of 
the purchase, the 95 South State Property was used as "a flea market," though it had formerly 
been the location of an auto repair shop, and the building on the property remained equipped with 
a vehicle hoist. Stevens Dep. at 26. 
2. Stevens bought the 95 South State Property with the intent to operate a business 
involving the acquisition, repair, and sale of damaged (salvaged) vehicles, and the repair of 
damaged vehicles owned by others. Stevens Dep. at 26-27 and 164. 
3. Stevens disclosed his intended use of the 95 South State Property to members of the 
LaVerkin City Council ("the City Council" or "the Council"). Stevens Dep. at 164-166 and 194. 
4. On June 2, 1999, according to the Council minutes of the meeting, "Stevens requested 
preliminary conditional use approval for an auto body shop and used car dealership at 95 South 
State." Mayor Doug Wilson rather presciently observed "that auto related businesses] tended to 
collect cars and that screened parking was necessary." After discussing concerns related to 
parking and screened fencing, the Council granted preliminary approval of the projected 
business. Council Minutes June 2, 1999. 
5. On January 5, 2000, at a meeting of the City Council, the minutes reflect that "[t]he 
Mayor commended Stevens on his improvements to the property." Additionally, the Council 
voted to issue Stevens a conditional use permit ("CUP") and business license for "an auto body 
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repair shop" "on the condition that sewer requirements are met." The CUP authorized by the 
Council did not include an expiration date and contained no other express conditions. Council 
Minutes January 5, 2000. 
6. Although the Council voted to issue the CUP, Stevens never received a physical CUP. 
Stevens Dep. at 168-169. 
7. Shortly after the January 5, 2000 meeting, Stevens commenced business operations as 
"Keystone Repair" at the 95 South State Property. 
8. In early 2002, Stevens purchased property located at 160 South State Street in 
LaVerkin ("the 160 South State Property"). Stevens Dep. at 27. At the time of the purchase, the 
160 South State Property was covered with refuse, including several burned out or stripped cars, 
large household appliances, construction equipment, old mattresses, etc. Stevens Dep. at 28-29. 
Stevens considerably improved the appearance of the 160 South State Property, burning the 
garbage that could be burned, and gathering and hauling what could not. Stevens Dep. at 29. 
9. At all times relevant to the instant case, the 95 South State Property and the 160 South 
State Property (collectively, "the Subject Properties") have been located within one of the City's 
"General Commercial" zoning districts. Stevens Dep. at 25-26 and 28. 
10. Shortly after purchasing the 160 South State Property, Stevens erected an opaque, 
panelled fence on the property and began to store vehicles there that would eventually be 
processed for repair at the 95 South State Property. Stevens Dep. at 46-47. Stevens had obtained 
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informal verbal approval to do so from City officials. Stevens Dep. at 195-196. 
11. At a City Council meeting held on January 7, 2004, Stevens sought and obtained a 
conditional use permit to use the front portion of the 160 South State Property as a used car lot 
for vehicles he refurbished at the 95 South State Property. The Council granted a 6-month CUP 
for "[n]o more than 20 re-furbished cars[.]" Council Minutes January 7, 2004. 
12. The minutes of the January 7, 2004 meeting also indicate that the City Council was 
informed of certain citizen complaints regarding visibility problems apparently caused by 
vehicles that Stevens had parked along the 100 South side street of his 95 South State Property. 
13. At a City Council meeting held on September 1, 2004, the Council approved an 
additional 6-month CUP for Stevens to continue using the 160 South State Property as a used car 
lot. The CUP approved at this meeting contained several conditions not included in the CUP 
issued on January 7, 2004. Stevens Dep. at 98-99. 
14. Stevens was present and participated at the meeting held on September 1, 2004. 
Stevens Dep. at 98-102. 
15. At no time after the City's approval of the September 1, 2004 CUP did Stevens 
appeal any of the conditions of the CUP to the LaVerkin City Board of Adjustment. Stevens 
Dep. at 103.3 
3
 The 160 South State Property CUP containing the conditions approved at the September 
1, 2004 meeting issued on November 30, 2004. There is also no evidence that Stevens appealed 
5 
16. On October 13, 2004, the City of LaVerkin held a Joint Work Meeting of the City 
Council and the Planning Commission, primarily addressing concerns arising from vehicles 
parked on and around Stevens's business properties. Participants indicated their understanding 
that Stevens had originally been given approval to use the 95 South State Property only for an 
auto body repair shop, and that his use of the property to store and refurbish wrecked vehicles 
was unauthorized. Once again, safety issues related to the parking of Stevens's vehicles on 100 
South were discussed; participants stressed that children travel that street on their way to school. 
The Council also discussed plans to repair 100 South, and potentially to widen it, paying Stevens 
for the portion of his property that would need to be condemned in doing so. Council Minutes 
October 13, 2004. 
17. Though various other concerns were discussed, the consistent theme of most of them 
was that the expanding number of vehicles on and around Stevens's properties created an 
unsightly and unsafe situation neither contemplated nor approved by the City. The discussion 
ended with the Council resolving to make Stevens's continued operation of his business 
conditional on his satisfaction of several requirements related to parking and usage of the 
property. Council Minutes October 13, 2004. 
18. On December 15, 2004, the City Council held a review hearing to consider 
the conditions to the Board of Adjustment after that time.. 
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revocation of the CUP issued to Stevens for the 95 South State Property on January 5, 2000, 
purportedly due to reports that Stevens was violating the conditions on which the CUP was 
issued. 
19. Stevens was present and participated in the December 15, 2004 hearing. Stevens 
Dep. at 105 and 108. 
20. At the conclusion of the December 15, 2004, hearing, the City Council determined 
not to revoke the CUP issued on January 5, 2000, but to modify the CUP by converting it to a 
temporary, 6-month CUP, with additional conditions. 
21. On or about January 7, 2005, the City issued the modified 95 South State CUP. 
Stevens Dep. at 111. 
22. At no time after the City's approval of the modified 95 South State CUP or its 
issuance of the modified 95 South State CUP did Stevens appeal any of the conditions of the 
modified CUP to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustment. Stevens Dep. at 112 and 139. 
23. At some point, the City determined that the work it desired to do on 100 South, 
including widening the road, might reduce the distance between the street and Stevens's building 
on the 95 South State Property so much that the building would be non-compliant with certain 
zoning regulations and the entire property would need to be condemned. Reeves Dep. at 42-44 
and 61. 
24. Concluding that the City's ownership of the 95 South State Property would resolve 
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the zoning concern as well as ongoing concerns regarding the property's appearance and the 
public safety, the Council determined to enter into negotiations with Stevens for the acquisition 
of the 95 South State Property. Reeves Dep. at 44 and 62. 
25. Beginning some months prior to August 2005, the City and Stevens discussed the 
possible sale of the 95 South State Property to the City. Stevens Dep. at 141. 
26. On June 1, 2005, the City conducted a review hearing to consider 
revocation/non-renewal of Stevens's 160 South State CUP based upon Stevens's apparent 
non-compliance with certain conditions. Stevens Dep. at 120-121. Stevens was present at the 
hearing. Stevens Dep. at 122. 
27. At the conclusion of the hearing, the City Council found that Stevens remained in 
non-compliance and voted to revoke/not renew the 160 South State CUP. Stevens Dep. at 122. 
28. No evidence has been presented that Stevens at any time appealed the 
revocation/non-renewal of the 160 South State CUP to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustment. 
29. On August 17, 2005, the City conducted a review hearing to consider the 
revocation/non-renewal of Stevens's modified 95 South State CUP based upon Stevens's 
apparent non-compliance with certain conditions. Stevens Dep. at 125. 
30. Stevens was present at the August 17, 2005 hearing and presented evidence in 
support of his position that the modified 95 South State CUP should not be revoked. Stevens 
Dep. at 125-126. At the conclusion of the hearing, however, the City Council found that Stevens 
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remained in non-compliance and voted to revoke/not renew the modified 95 South State CUP. 
Stevens Dep. at 128-129. 
31. At no time after the revocation/non-renewal of the modified 95 South State CUP did 
Stevens appeal the revocation/non-renewal to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustment. Stevens Dep. 
at 139-140. 
32. Notwithstanding the City's revocation/non-renewal of both the 160 South State CUP 
and the modified 95 South State CUP, Stevens continued to conduct business operations from 
the Subject Properties and purchased a number of flood-damaged vehicles to be transported to 
the Subject Properties, stored at the Subject Properties, and repaired or otherwise processed at the 
Subject Properties. Stevens Dep. at 123-124. 
33. By December 2005, the City and Stevens had been unable to reach an agreement 
regarding the sale of the 95 South State Property to the City. 
34. In an appraisal dated December 19, 2005, Morley & McConkie, a professional 
appraisal company hired by the City, estimated that just compensation for the 95 South State 
Property would be $300,000. 
35. By letter dated December 30, 2005, the City's Special Legal Counsel, Heath H. 
Snow, made an offer on behalf of the City to purchase the 95 South State Property from Stevens 
"for full appraised value plus and [sic] additional $10,000.00 for [Stevens's] moving expenses." 
The letter stated that the offer was "contingent upon [Stevens's] removal of [his] vehicles, parts 
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and other items of personal property to a location outside of the municipal boundaries of 
LaVerkin." 
36. After stating the City's offer, Snow warned of the consequences that would follow if 
Stevens rejected it: 
I have been given authorization for [sic] the LaVerkin City Council to 
issue this offer to you. I would hope that you closely evaluate its merits 
considering your current non-compliance with several City Ordinances. The 
LaVerkin City Council wanted me to reiterate to you that if you choose to not 
accept this offer and continue to operate your auto salvage business from this 
location without a conditional use permit and a business license (which expires 
tomorrow), they will be forced to seek an injunction against you immediately. In 
said injunctive action the City will seek an order of abatement which would allow 
the City to come on to your property and abate the unsightly blithe/nuisance and 
charge you for the costs of said abatement. The City will also seek criminal 
charges for operating a noxious business and operating a business without a 
license (Class B Misdemeanors). 
I would remind you that the City has administratively attempted to bring 
you and your business into City Code compliance long before it identified its 
interest in purchasing your property. From the City's perspective these are two 
separate issues. They have simply asked me to hold off my civil prosecution of 
your City Code violations while they attempted to engage in purchase negotiations 
for your property (which would collaterally resolve said City Code violations, at 
least as to your 95 South State property). 
Please note this offer expires at 5:00 pm next Wednesday, January 4, 
2006. I will look forward to hearing from you before then. 
37. Stevens received the above letter on January 3, 2006,4 and did not accept the City's 
4
 The letter was not entirely unexpected. At least a few days prior to receiving the letter, 
Stevens was advised, in a telephone conversation with Snow, of the letter's imminent arrival and 
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offer by the stated deadline of January 4, 2006. 
38. In a letter dated January 5, 2006, the City Manager, Benjamin A. Reeves, sent 
Stevens notice "that the City of LaVerkin intends to not renew your business license for your 
automobile repair and salvage business located at 95 South State Street. This action will be 
formally taken by the LaVerkin City Council at its regularly scheduled meeting on January 18, 
2006." Stevens Dep. at 156-157. 
39. On January 18, 2006, Stevens filed a Complaint against the City of LaVerkin, 
alleging that the City had attempted, by threatening civil and criminal prosecution, and by 
refusing to renew Stevens's conditional use permits and business license, to coerce Stevens to 
sell his real property, and that such conduct gave rise to a cause of action for inverse 
condemnation. Stevens also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit the City from, among other things, refusing to issue a business license to 
him. 
40. In a letter dated January 18, 2006, Chief Lloyd Watkins of the LaVerkin City Police 
Department advised Stevens that "[d]ue to the fact that [his] conditional license ha[d] been 
revoked and that [his] regular business license expired on . . . December 31, 2005,[5] [Stevens] 
contents. Stevens Dep. at 149-150. 
5
 It appears there is a dispute regarding whether Stevens's business license expired on 
December 31, 2005, or on January 18, 2006, when the City Council voted to revoke/not renew it. 
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[was] no longer allowed to do any business in the city of LaVerkin," and u[t]he only allowable 
activity on [Stevens's] business premise [was] the physical removal of the vehicles." 
41. Watkins warned, "If there is any other activity on the premises, including the storage 
of vehicles, this will be considered as doing business. You will be issued a citation for every day 
that this occurs." Finally, Watkins stated, "In addition to you no longer having a business license 
the vehicles on your properties are considered a nuisance under the city ordinance," and included 
a copy of the then-current nuisance ordinance. 
42. On the evening of January 18, 2006, as Reeves had stated in his letter, the City 
conducted a formal review hearing to consider the revocation/non-renewal of Stevens's business 
license. Stevens Dep. at 157. 
43. At the hearing, Stevens was personally present and was represented by legal counsel, 
and was given the opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his position that 
his business license should not be revoked/non-renewed. Stevens Dep. at 157. 
44. At the conclusion of the hearing, however, the Council voted to revoke/not to renew 
Stevens's business license. Stevens Dep. at 158. 
45. On January 20, 2006, after allegedly observing Stevens's employees conducting 
business activities at the 95 South State Property on both January 19, 2006 and January 20, 2006, 
officers of the LaVerkin City Police Department entered the 95 South State Property and forcibly 
closed Stevens's business operations there. The officers posted a notice of closure and ordered 
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the employees to cease working and to leave the premises. 
46. Since January 20, 2006, business operations at the Subject Properties have remained 
closed. 
47. Stevens was subsequently criminally prosecuted for allegedly operating a business 
without a license, and the City reported its revocation of Stevens's business license to the Utah 
State Tax Commission. Stevens Dep. at 193-194. 
48. The City has now disavowed any interest in obtaining either of the Subject 
Properties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
STEVENS'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Stevens seeks "a Court Order enjoining [the City] from a) using its police powers to deny 
renewal of [Stevens's] business license, b) sending police officers and other city officials, 
employees or agents to harass [Stevens] and/or [Stevens's] employees, and c) filing complaints 
or reports with Utah's Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division in furtherance of [the City's] effort 
to retaliate against or harm [Stevens]." PL Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for TRO and Prelim. Inj. at 5-
6. 
Preliminary Issues 
As a preliminary matter, the City challenges Stevens's ability to obtain the relief he seeks 
via a motion for an injunction. The City argues that Stevens's motion is "essentially moot" 
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because the City has already done the things Stevens asks the Court to prevent the City from 
doing, such as 1) revoking/not renewing his business license, 2) sending the police to close 
Stevens's business by force, and 3) reporting the non-renewal of Stevens's business license to the 
Utah State Tax Commission. Looking to the purpose of the motion, the City asserts that "the 
relief that one must assume [Stevens] desires," such as "an order requiring the City to reinstate 
[Stevens's] business license and an order allowing him to reopen his business," "would come in 
the form of some sort of order or writ of mandamus." Because "[t]his type of relief has neither 
been requested, nor briefed by the parties," the City argues that "it is not properly before the 
Court." Mem. in Opp. to PI. Mot. at 14. 
As authority supporting its argument, the City cites only to Rule 7(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides, in part; "An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion . . . . A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief 
sought and the grounds for the relief sought." 
Stevens has not responded to this argument, but the City is correct. The obvious purpose 
of Stevens's motion is to continue operating his business, and it is undisputed that he may not 
lawfully do so without a business license,6 which the City has now revoked/not renewed. 
6
 Section 3-1-3 of the La Verkin City Code provides: 
It shall be a class B misdemeanor for any person to transact, engage in or carry on 
any business, trade, profession or calling or to operate a vending, pinball or coin 
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Stevens has requested that the Court prohibit the City from, among other things, udeny[ing] 
renewal of [his] business license." Although this request for relief is framed in injunctive terms, 
it is plain that because the City revoked/declined to renew Stevens's license on the very day 
Stevens's motion was filed, Stevens is in reality requesting the Court to compel the City to act 
rather than to refrain from acting. That being the case, Stevens should have specifically 
requested such relief. 
There is a more fundamental procedural concern, however, than Stevens's mere failure to 
state with particularity the relief he seeks: it is not clear that Stevens has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. It is undisputed that Stevens has not appealed the Council's 
revocation/non-renewal of his business license to the Board of Adjustment.7 There is apparently 
operated machine without first receiving the class or type of license required by 
the city. 
7
 It is also undisputed that Stevens has not appealed the City Council's 
modification/revocation/non-renewal of his CUPs to the Board of Adjustment. The City has not 
presented evidence, however, that current zoning ordinances would require Stevens's business to 
have a CUP. If they did, Stevens's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies would clearly 
bar his pursuit of a writ of mandamus to compel City officials to issue CUPs. The City has cited 
LaVerkin City Code § 10-9-2, which requires "all uses listed as conditional uses" to have a 
conditional use permit, but the City has not cited any ordinance defining Stevens's business as a 
conditional use. In footnote 2 of its initial memorandum, the City cited § 10-6G-1-3 of the 
LaVerkin City Code for the proposition that any business "remotely similar to [Stevens's] is a 
conditional use." The current version of the cited ordinance, however, is apparently § 10-6G-2, 
which defines the uses listed in footnote 2-automobile and truck sales, garages for the repair of 
automobiles, and garages for the storage of automobiles-as "permitteduses within the general 
commercial zone." (Emphasis added.) 
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some dispute about the availability of an appeals process for the revocation/non-renewal of a 
business license.8 
If an administrative appeals process exists, Stevens must avail himself of it prior to 
pursuing mandamus or injunctive relief. £ee Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning 
Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983) (dismissing a petition for an extraordinary writ, and 
explaining that "the plaintiffs failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prevents him from 
seeking relief at this time from the courts"); Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331, 332 (Utah 
1980) ("[Administrative remedies must first be exhausted before mandamus will lie.") (citing 
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964); Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 
1346 (Utah 1979)); Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 472 (Utah 2003) (denying 
injunctive relief where plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Kunz & Co. v. Utah 
DOT, 913 P.2d 765, 770-771 (Utah App. 1996) (denying injunctive relief where plaintiff failed 
to exhaust administrative remedies). 
Because the City has not had the opportunity to address this argument, the Court is unable 
to determine whether Stevens has exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to the 
8
 In his supplemental memorandum, Stevens argues for the first time that he should not be 
penalized for failing to appeal the City's revocation/non-renewal of his business license to the 
Board of Adjustment because the City Recorder did not respond to his counsel's letter inquiring 
about the administrative appeals process. PI. Supp. Mem. at 19-20. Like so many of Stevens's 
other arguments, this one is unaccompanied by citation to any legal authority, and because the 
argument was raised so late, the City has not had the opportunity to address it. 
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revocation/non-renewal of his business license, and whether he is now properly before the Court. 
Consequently, the Court may not grant Stevens's motion at this time. 
Rule 65A(e) 
Moreover, even if Stevens has exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to the 
denial of his business license, Stevens has not satisfied the requirements for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction under Rule 65A(e).9 His most obvious failing under the Rule involves the 
final requirement that Stevens demonstrate either a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
of the underlying claim or that serious issues are presented that "should be the subject of further 
litigation." 
Stevens's underlying inverse condemnation claim rests on the rationale that the City 
9
 Rule 65A(e) provides: 
A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a showing by 
the applicant that: 
(e)(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(e)(2) The threatened injury to the applicant outweighs whatever 
damage the proposed order or injunction may cause the party 
restrained or enjoined; 
(e)(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant will 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be the subject of further 
litigation. 
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committed a taking without just compensation when it refused to renew Stevens's conditional 
use permits or his business license, and when it threatened to prosecute him civilly and 
criminally if he declined to accept the City's offer to purchase the 95 South State Property. 
Stevens has presented the Court with neither relevant legal authority nor persuasive legal 
argument that the underlying claim is in any way grounded in established law. Although Stevens 
has cited authority to support the argument that a business license is a property interest of which 
a person may not be deprived without due process of law, ^ ee Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 
(1971), Stevens has cited no authority to support the very different argument that the deprivation 
of such property without due process constitutes a taking for which just compensation must be 
paid.10 Similarly, although Stevens has cited authority to support his argument that a 
municipality must adhere to certain policies when it undertakes to acquire private property, see 
U.C.A. § 57-12-13, Stevens has cited no authority to support the very different argument that the 
City's failure to abide by such policies in any attempted acquisition constitutes a taking. The 
City has repeatedly and emphatically denied any present interest in Stevens's property. For all of 
the foregoing reasons, Stevens's motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary 
injunction is denied. 
10
 Moreover, even if such a deprivation did constitute a taking, Stevens has not identified 
any specific due process failure of the City in depriving him of his conditional use permits and 
business license. It is undisputed that Stevens was given notice and an opportunity to be heard 
prior to the deprivation of his conditional use permits and business license. 
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THE CITY'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
The City has filed a motion to enjoin Stevens "from conducting any farther business 
operations from his properties located at 95 South State Street and 160 South State Street in 
LaVerkin, Utah, including the further unloading and storage of wrecked or salvaged vehicles." 
Cross Motion for Prelim. Inj. at 2. 
At oral argument, however, the City's special counsel stated that its motion was "almost 
moot" if Stevens's motion were denied because the City's intent was essentially to maintain the 
status quo, or to keep Stevens's business closed, as it has been since January 20, 2006. 
"Injunction, being an extraordinary remedy, should not be lightly granted." System Concepts v. 
Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983). Since the City apparently does not view its motion as 
necessary at this stage, its motion is also denied.11 
ORDER 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that: 
1. Robert C. Stevens's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction 
is denied. 
2. The City of LaVerkin's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied. 
DATED this day of August, 2006. 
11
 This disposition makes it unnecessary to address the City's arguments under Rule 
65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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BY THE COURT: 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
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COMES NOW Defendant/Counterclaimant, The City of LaVerkin, a Utah municipal 
corporation (hereinafter "Counterclaimant" or the "City"), by and through its special legal 
counsel, Bingham & Snow L.L.P., and hereby files its Motion for Summary Judgment requesting 
that judgment be entered against Plaintiff and that all claims against the City be dismissed with 
prejudice. This Motion is made pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is 
supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed concurrently herewith. 
If Summary Judgment is not rendered against said Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant moves for an Order under Rule 56(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that the Court determine what material facts exist without substantial controversy and 
what facts are actually in good faith controvert and render Partial Summary Judgment in those 
matters not in controversy. 
This Motion is based upon the pleadings, affidavits and memorandum of points and 
authorities filed herewith, all of which establish that there is no genuine issue to any material 
fact, and that Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
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BINGHAM & SNOW, L.L.P. 
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COMES NOW Defendant/Counterclaimant, The City of LaVerkin, a Utah municipal 
corporation (hereinafter "Counterclaimant" or the "City"), by and through its special legal 
counsel, Bingham & Snow L.L.P., and hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Robert Stevens, 
pursuant to Rule 56 (summary judgment) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4-501 
of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration requires that movements for summary 
judgment give concise statements of material facts for which no genuine issue exists. The 
following are material facts for which no genuine issue exists. 
STATEMENT OF FACT TO WHICH NO GENUINE ISSUE EXISTS 
1. In late 1998 or early 1999, Stevens purchased property located at 95 South State 
Street ("the 95 South State Property") in LaVerkin, Utah. At the time of the purchase, fee 95 
South State Property was used as "a flea market," and had formerly been the location of an auto 
repair shop. See Court's Findings of Fact contained in Memorandum and Decision and Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for A Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction and 
Denying Defendant's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction ("Findings of Fact"), ^ 1. 
2. Stevens bought the 95 South State Property'with the alleged intent to operate a 
business involving the acquisition, repair, and sale of damaged (salvaged) vehicles, and the repair 
of damaged vehicles owned by others. See Findings of Fact ]f 2. 
3. Stevens allegedly disclosed his intended use of the 95 South State Property to 
members of the LaVerkin City Council ("the City Council" or "the Council"). See Findings of 
Fact If 3 
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4. On June 2, 1999, according to the Council minutes of the meeting, "Stevens 
requested preliminary conditional use approval for an auto body shop and used car dealership at 
95 South State." Mayor Doug Wilson observed "that auto related businesses tended to collect 
cars and that screened parking was necessary." After discussing concerns related to parking and 
screened fencing, the Council granted preliminary approval of the projected business. See 
Findings of Fact f^ 4. 
5. On January 5, 2000, the Council voted to issue Stevens a conditional use permit 
("CUP") and business license for "an auto body repair shop" "on the condition that sewer 
requirements are met." The CUP authorized by the Council did not include an expiration date 
and contained no other express conditions. See Findings of Fact f^ 5. 
6. Although the Council voted to issue the CUP, Stevens never received a physical 
CUP. See Findings of Fact If 6. 
7. Shortly after the January 5, 2000 meeting, Stevens commenced business 
operations as "Keystone Repair" at the 95 South State Property. See Findings of Fact f^ 7. 
8. In early 2002, Stevens purchased property located at 160 South State Street in 
LaVerkin ("the 160 South State Property"). See Findings of Fact f 8. 
9. At all times relevant to the instant case, the 95 South State Property and the 160 
South State Property (collectively, "the Subject Properties") have been located within one of the 
City's "General Commercial" zoning districts. See Findings of Fact f 9. 
10. Shortly after purchasing the 160 South State Property, Stevens erected an opaque, 
paneled fence on the property and began to store vehicles on the property to await repair at the 95 
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South State Street Property. Stevens claims he had obtained informal verbal approval to do so 
from City officials.. See Findings of Fact f^ 10. 
11. At a City Council meeting held on January 7, 2004, Stevens sought and obtained a 
conditional use permit ("CUP") to use the front portion of the 160 South State Property as a used 
car lot for vehicles he refurbished at the 95 South State Property. The Council granted a 6-month 
CUP for a[n]o more than 20 re-furbished cars." See Findings of Fact f 11. 
12. The minutes of the January 7, 2004 meeting also indicate that the City Council 
was informed of citizen complaints regarding visibility problems caused by vehicles Stevens had 
parked along the 100 South side street of his 95 South State Property. See Findings of Fact f^ 12. 
13. At a City Council meeting held September 1, 2004, the Council approved an 
additional 6-month CUP for Stevens to continue using the 160 South State Property as a used car 
lot. The CUP approved at this meeting contained several conditions not included in the CUP 
issued on January 7, 2004. See Findings of Fact 113. 
14. Stevens was present and participated at the meeting held on September 1, 2004. 
See Findings of Fact f 14. 
15. At no time after the City's approval of the September 1, 2004 CUP did Stevens 
appeal any of the conditions of the CUP to the LaVerkin City Board of Adjustment. See 
Findings of Fact f^ 15. 
16. On October 13, 2004, the City of LaVerkin held a Joint Work Meeting of the City 
Council and the Planning Commission, primarily addressing concerns arising from vehicles 
parked on and around Stevens' business properties. Participants indicated their understanding 
that Stevens had originally been given approval to use the 95 South State Property only for an 
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auto body repair shop, and that his use of the property to store and refurbish wrecked vehicles 
was unauthorized. Safety issues related to the parking of Stevens' vehicles on 100 South were 
discussed, and participants stressed that children travel that street on their way to school. The 
Council also discussed plans to repair 100 South and potentially widen it, paying Stevens for the 
portion of his property that would need to be condemned in doing so. See Findings of Fact f 16. 
17. Though other concerns were discussed, most of the concerns centered around the 
fact that an expanding number of vehicles on and around Stevens' properties created an unsightly 
and unsafe situation neither contemplated nor approved by the City. The discussion ended with 
the Council resolving to make Stevens' continued operation of his business conditional on his 
satisfaction of several requirements related to parking and usage of the property. See Findings of 
Fact 117. 
18. On December 15, 2004, after Stevens failed to comply with certain conditions 
imposed at the October 13, 2004 meeting and certain conditions upon which the CUP was issued, 
the City Council held a review hearing to consider revocation of the CUP issued to Stevens for 
the 95 South State Property on January 5, 2000. See Findings of Fact % 18. 
19. Stevens was present and participated in the December 15, 2004 hearing. See 
Findings of Fact f^ 19. 
20. At the conclusion of the December 15, 2004 hearing, the City Council determined 
not to revoke the CUP issued on January 5, 2000, but to modify the CUP by converting it to a 
temporary, 6-month CUP, with additional conditions. The City issued the modified 95 South 
State CUP on or about January 7, 2005. See Findings of Fact f 20. 
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21. At no time after the City's approval of the modified 95 South State CUP or its 
issuance of the modified 95 South State CUP did Stevens appeal any of the conditions of the 
modified CUP to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustment. See Findings of Fact f 22. 
23. At some point, the City determined that future work it desired to do on 100 South, 
including widening the road, might reduce the distance between the street and Stevens' building 
on the 95 South State Property so much that the building would be non-compliant with certain 
zoning regulations and the City might have to condemn the property or certain portions of the 
property. See Findings of Fact f 23. 
24. The City concluded that the City's ownership of the 95 South State Property 
would resolve the zoning concern as well as ongoing concerns regarding the property's 
appearance and the public safety, and for that reason, the Council determined to enter into 
negotiations with Stevens for the acquisition of the 95 South State Property. See Findings of 
Fact If 24. 
25. Beginning some months prior to August 2005, the City and Stevens discussed the 
possible sale of the 95 South State Property to the City. See Findings of Fact f 25. 
26. On June 1, 2005, the City conducted a review hearing to consider revocation/non-
renewal of Stevens' 160 South State CUP based upon Stevens' non-compliance with conditions 
imposed on Stevens' use of the 160 South State property. Stevens was present at the hearing. 
See Findings of Fact f 26. 
27. At the conclusion of the June 1, 2005 hearing, the City Council found that Stevens 
was not in compliance with the conditions of his CUP and voted to revoke/not renew the 160 
South State CUP. See Findings of Fact f 27. 
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28. Stevens did not, at any time, appeal the revocation/non-renewal of the 160 South 
State CUP to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustments. See Findings of Fact f^ 28. 
29. On August 17, 2005, the City conducted a review hearing to consider the 
revocation/non-renewal of Stevens' modified 95 South State CUP based upon Stevens' non-
compliance with conditions of the 95 South State CUP. See Findings of Fact ^ 29. 
30. Stevens was present at the August 17, 2005 hearing and presented evidence in 
support of his position that the modified 95 South State CUP should not be revoked. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the City Council found that Stevens remained in non-compliance and 
voted to revoke/not renew the modified 95 South State CUP. See Findings of Fact ^ 30. 
31. At no time after the revocation/non-renewal of the modified 95 South State CUP 
did Stevens appeal the revocation/non-renewal of the 95 South State CUP to the LaVerkin Board 
of Adjustments. See Findings of Fact f^ 31. 
32. Although the City had revoked/not renewed both the 160 South State CUP and 
the modified 95 South State CUP, Stevens continued to conduct business operations from the 
Subject Properties and purchased a number of flood-damaged vehicles, which were to be 
transported to the Subject Properties, stored at the Subject Properties, and repaired or otherwise 
processed at the Subject Properties. See Findings of Fact f^ 32. 
33. By December 2005, the City and Stevens had been unable to reach an agreement 
regarding the sale of the 95 South State Property to the City. See Findings of Fact f^ 33. 
34. In an appraisal dated December 19, 2005, Morley & McConkie, a professional 
appraisal company hired by the City but chosen by Stevens, estimated that just compensation for 
the 95 South State Property would be $300,000.00. See Findings of Fact % 34. 
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35. In a letter dated December 30, 2005, the City's Special Legal Counsel, made an 
offer on behalf of the City to purchase the 95 South State Property from Stevens "for foil 
appraised value plus and [sic] additional $10,000.00 for [Stevens'] moving expenses." The letter 
stated that the offer was "contingent upon [Stevens'] removal of [his] vehicles, parts and other 
items of personal property to a location outside of the municipal boundaries of LaVerkin." See 
Findings of Fact f 35. 
36. Stevens did not accept the City's offer. See Findings of Fact f^ 37. 
37. In a letter dated January 5, 2006, the City Manager, Benjamin A. Reeves, sent 
Stevens notice that the City of LaVerkin intended not to renew his business license for the 
automobile repair and salvage business located at 95 South State Street due to his noncompliance 
with City requests. The letter provided notice that the action would be formally taken by the 
LaVerkin City Council at its regularly scheduled meeting on January 18, 2006." See Findings of 
Fact 1f 38. 
38. On January 18, 2006, Stevens filed a Complaint against the City of LaVerkin, 
alleging that the City had attempted, by threatening civil and criminal prosecution, and by 
refusing to renew Stevens' conditional use permits and business license, to coerce Stevens to sell 
his real property, and that such conduct gave rise to a cause of action for inverse condemnation. 
Stevens also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to 
prohibit the City from, among other things, refusing to issue a business license to him. A 
preliminary injunction was later denied by this Court. See Findings of Fact J^ 39. 
39. In a letter dated January 18, 2006, Chief Lloyd Watkins of the LaVerkin City 
Police Department advised Stevens that because the City had revoked his CUP and because his 
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regular business license expired on December 31, 2005, Stevens was no longer allowed to do 
business in the City of LaVerkin. See Findings of Fact f 40. 
40. On the evening of January 18, 2006, as Reeves had stated in his letter, the City 
conducted a formal review hearing to consider the revocation/non-renewal of Steven's business 
license. See Findings of Fact f^ 42. 
41. At the hearing, Stevens was personally present and was represented by legal 
counsel and was given the opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his 
position that his business license should be renewed. See Findings of Fact f 43. 
42. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Council voted to revoke/not to renew 
Stevens' business license. See Findings of Fact f 44. 
43. On January 20, 2006, after observing Stevens' employees conducting business 
activities at the 95 South State Property on both January 19, 2006 and January 20, 2006, officers 
of the LaVerkin City Police Department entered the 95 South State Property and closed Stevens' 
business operations there. The officers posted a notice of closure and ordered the employees to 
cease working and to leave the premises. See Findings of Fact f^ 45. 
44. Stevens was subsequently criminally prosecuted for allegedly operating a business 
without a license, and the City reported its revocation of Stevens' business license to the Utah 
State Tax Commission. See Findings of Fact f 47. 
46. The City has no interest in obtaining either of the Subject Properties. See 
Findings of Fact ^ [48. 
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ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE CITY BECAUSE THERE IS NO ISSUE OF GENUINE FACT AND THE 
MATERIAL FACTS SHOW THE CITY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment in favor of the City is appropriate in this matter. Utah Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
However, it is not requisite that the movant show the nonexistence of all issues of fact in 
the case as a whole, but only those that are material to the resolution of the case. See Horgan v. 
Industrial Design Corporation, 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982). The foregoing statement of facts 
are the material facts as found by the Court in the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding the parties' motions for preliminary injunction Even taking these facts in a light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, no reasonable jury would find in favor of Stevens because the material 
facts show Stevens did not exhaust his administrative remedies and because Stevens cannot 
present evidence sufficient to support his inverse condemnation claim. Thus, this Court should 
grant summary judgment in the City's favor. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
a. Stevens failed to appeal or timely seek judicial review of the City's 
revocation/ non-renewal of his Business License. 
i. Stevens was afforded appropriate due process with regards to the 
revocation/non-renewal of his business license. 
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The City provided Stevens proper due process. LaVerkin City Code section § 3-1-2 
provides that the LaVerkin City Clerk or Recorder is designated as the person who enforces all of 
the provisions of its business licensure ordinances (Title 3, Section 1) including the issuance, 
revocation and denial/non-renewal of business licenses pursuant to Sections 3-1-4 and 3-1-13 
respectively. Section 3-1-13 of the LaVerkin City Code sets forth the procedural process due in 
instances where the City (via its Clerk or Recorder) intends to revoke or not renew a person or 
entity's business license. Specifically pursuant to Section 3-l-13(B) the a licensee is to be 
notified that the LaVerkin City Council will ratify its staffs decision at a regular or special City 
Council Meeting which is held no less than 10 but no later than 30 days after written notice is 
given to the licensee. 
The City strictly followed these Sections of its Ordinance when its staff (specifically its 
Clerk) decided not to renew Stevens' business license. The City Clerk's decision was ratified by 
the City Council on January 18, 2006 at its regularly scheduled meeting. Mr. Stevens was given 
written notice of the City's intentions in a letter dated January 5, 2006, from the LaVerkin City 
Manager to Stevens ("Revocation Notice"). See Findings of Fact f 38. 
The Revocation Notice informed Mr. Stevens of his right to appear, be represented by 
legal counsel and present evidence in support of his position. Mr. Stevens, did in fact, appear by 
and through counsel at the January 18, 2006 LaVerkin City Council Meeting and addressed the 
City Council prior the City Clerk's decision being ratified. 
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ii. Stevens failed to timely request an administrative hearing pursuant to 
LaVerkin City Code 1-8-1 et. seq. to appeal the City's decision to not 
revoke/not renew his business license 
The LaVerkin City Code establishes that when a license (of any type) is revoked/not 
renewed, an administrative hearing (appeal) must be requested within 30 days to the City Clerk 
or Recorder. See LaVerkin City Code § 1-8-2. Notwithstanding this right to appeal, Stevens 
wholly failed to request such an administrative hearing. Stevens may argue that he is relieved of 
this requirement because his legal counsel sent a letter to the City requesting information about 
the appeal process, to which they received no response. Said position is flawed. Persons such as 
Stevens and his legal counsel are deemed to be on constructive notice of all aspects of the law, 
and any ignorance thereof is not a defense. See Worrall V. Ogden City Fire Department 616 
P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1980) ("It is an axiom of American law that an individual's ignorance of the 
law, or of a statutory provision, may not be raised to defeat its application to him in a legal 
action."). Because of his failure to exhaust this administrative remedy he is now barred from 
bringing this issue before the Court. 
Hi. Even if the Court were to construe the action taken by the LaVerkin City 
Council on January 18, 2006, to be the fulfillment of the administrative process 
prescribed by Section 1-8-3 of the LaVerkin City Code, Stevens has failed to 
timely seek judicial review of the LaVerkin City Council's ruling pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703.7(5)(a)(Hi) from this Court. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703.7(5)(a)(iii) a person adversely affected by an 
administrative proceeding of a municipality may only petition a District Court in Utah if the 
petition is filed within 30 days of the entry of a final administrative determination. In the case at 
bar, even if the Court were to construe the action taken by the LaVerkin City Council at its 
January 18, 2006, as being the fulfillment of the administrative hearing process proscribed by 
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Section 1-8-1 et seq of the LaVerkm City Code, Stevens has failed to seek judicial review 
withm 30 days On January 18, 2006, the LaVerkm City Council ratified the City Clerk's 
decision to not renew Mr Stevens' business license This decision was final and was followed 
by written notice to Stevens followed by physical closure of Mr Steven's business and a 
criminal citation See Findings of Fact f^ 3 8-40 
If the LaVerkm City Council's actions on January 18, 2006, constituted the 
administrative hearing contemplated by Section 1-8-1 et seq of the LaVerkm City Code then 
Stevens had 30 days to seek this Court's review of that decision, to wit February 17, 2006 
Stevens has wholly failed to seek such a review Stevens has neither attempted to amend the 
above-captioned action to include a cause of action for judicial review, nor filed a separate 
petition for judicial review Accordingly, Stevens is completely barred from seeking any type of 
relief on account of the City's revocation/non-renewal of his business license The City's 
revocation/non-renewal of Stevens' business license and subsequent closure of his business is the 
crux of his inverse condemnation claim, and thus it fails for the same reason and summary 
judgment should be granted accordingly 
Summary judgment is appropriate when a Plaintiff has not fully completed the 
administrative process Levie v Sevier County, 617 P 2d 331, 332 (Utah 1980) Utah courts 
simply do not exercise subject matter junsdiction over a plaintiffs claim if a statute or ordinance 
requires exhaustion of remedies and the plaintiff failed to pursue remedies available to him See 
Horn v. Utah Dep't of Pub Safety, 962 P 2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct App 1998), see also Patterson v 
American Fork City, 67 P 3d 466 (Utah 2003) (finding that where the legislature has imposed a 
specific exhaustion requirement that the courts will enforce it strictly) Unfortunately for 
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Stevens, Utah law leaves no "wiggle room", and this Court should grant summary judgment in 
favor of the City. 
b. Stevens failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the modification and 
eventual revocation of his Conditional Use Permits thus he is barred from citing 
these actions as a defense to the revocation of his Business License. 
Even if Stevens persuades the Court that: 1) he exhausted his administrative remedies as 
to the revocation of his business license, and 2) he timely sought judicial review of this decision, 
his appeal to this court fails on the merits. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a) courts 
acting as the appellate body reviewing a land use decision rendered by a municipality is to: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of 
this chapter (Utah Municipal Land Use, Development and Management Act) is 
valid; and (ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance or regulation 
is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. 
i. The City's decision to revoke/not renew his Business License was not 
illegal but rather prescribed under its ordinances. 
Any arguments made by Stevens that the revocation of his Business License was 
improper because the use of his 95 South State Property and the 160 South State Property were 
legal non-conforming uses (aka "Grandfathered Use") are not supported by the facts or the law. 
This is especially true because Stevens cannot show that the City's actions were either illegal or 
arbitrary or capricious. This Court has made specific findings concerning both the 95 South 
State CUP and the 160 South State CUP, showing Stevens failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies by virtue of his failure to appeal the City's modification or revocation of these permits 
to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustments. Section 10-9-11 of the LaVerkin City Code states that 
"[a]ny person has the right to appeal the decision to grant, grant with conditions or deny a 
conditional use permit to the Board of Adjustment." Although this section of the LaVerkin City 
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Code appears to be discretionary, Utah Appellate Courts have determined that words such as 
"may" in the context of an applicant appealing an adverse land use decision means that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. See Merrihew v. Salt Lake County 
Planning & Zoning Comm'q 659 P.2d 1065, 1066-1067 (Utah 1983) (use of the word "may" is 
discretionary only in the sense that there is no requirement that a bereaved party appeal an 
adverse administrative decision at all). 
In October 2005, the LaVerkin City Council passed an ordinance which revised the 
definitional section (10-1-6) of Title 10 (Zoning Regulations) of the LaVerkin City Code. One 
of the revisions was the inclusion of the definition of the term wrecking/salvage yard which it 
defined as: 
Any automotive business that relies on vehicles that are damaged and brought to 
the business for repair or for salvage by persons who have no interest in the repair 
or salvage of said vehicles. Resale or salvage value for the business shall not be a 
consideration of interest in the repair or salvage of the vehicle. 
In March of 2006, the LaVerkin City Council amended Section 10-6G-3 (General Commercial 
Zone - Prohibited Uses) of the LaVerkin City Code to expressly make wrecking/salvage yards a 
prohibited use in all General Commercial Zones within the City. Mr. Steven's properties have 
always been located in a General Commercial Zone. Although these revisions adversely 
affected Mr. Stevens, the City clearly had the discretion to modify its land use ordinances.1 
Acting in this type of legislative capacity, the LaVerkin City Council is given great deference. In 
fact, the standard for review of such an action is "reasonably debatable" according to the Utah 
See U.C.A. § 10-30-702 ("The governing body may pass any ordinance to regulate, require, prohibit, 
govern, control or supervise any activity, business, conduct or condition authorized by this act or any other 
provision of law.") (emphasis added). 
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Municipal Land Use, Development and Management Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
801(3)(b) ("A decision, ordinance or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is 
valid of the decision, ordinance or regulation is reasonably debatable and not illegal.").2 
Because of the above-mentioned changes in the City's Zoning Ordinances, the only way 
that Stevens can argue that he was operating a legal business from his 95 South State Property 
and the 160 South State Property is to argue that his business is a legal nonconforming use. 
Section 10-1-6 of the LaVerkin City Code defines a anon-conforming use" as: 
The use of a building or structure of land which does not conform to the use 
regulations for the district in which it is situated, but which was in conformity 
with applicable regulations, if any, at the time of its establishment. 
Steven's use of his properties is a non-conforming use, but it is not a "legal" non-conforming 
use. In Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 988 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. Ct. 1999), the Utah 
Appellate Court defined a "legal" nonconforming use as: 
. . . a use of land that: (i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; (ii) 
has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning iegulation governing 
the land changed; and (iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not 
conform with the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
It is uncontroverted that, at the time Stevens began his business at his 95 South State 
Property and arguably his 160 South State Property, he needed to have a conditional use permit 
2 
Stevens claims the City arbitrarily and capriciously changed its ordinances to force him to sell his business. See 
Stevens Complaint f 46, 47. This is not the case. An ordinance is not an invalid expression of city power simply 
because an ordinance adversely affects a given party. See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 627-628 
(Utah 1990) ("[Tjhat the exercise of proper police regulations may to some extent prevent enjoyment of individual 
rights in property or cause inconvenience or loss to the owner, does not necessarily render the police law 
unconstitutional, for the reason that such laws are not considered as appropriating private property for a public use, 
but- simply as regulating its use and enjoyment, and if the owner through a lawful exercise of the power suffers 
inconvenience, injury, or a loss, it is regarded as damnum absque injuria."). 
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to operate his business from those locations. In fact, Stevens applied for and received 
conditional use permits for both properties. Under Hugoe, Stevens is required to maintain both 
his 95, South State CUP and his 160 South State CUP in order to remain a "legal" nonconforming 
use status. As previously established by the Court in its Findings of Facts, both of Stevens5 
CUPs were revoked and Stevens have failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies by 
appealing those actions to the LaVerkin Board of Adjustments within 30 days. See Findings of 
Fact f 27-31. 
With no valid conditional use permits and no way to contest their revocation, Stevens 
cannot argue he has "legal" non-conforming use status. Accordingly, Stevens continued use of 
his 95 South State Property and his 160 South State Property was both illegal under both the 
City's current zoning ordinances and its zoning ordinances in place at the time Stevens originally 
began his business. Operating an illegal or non-permitted business in a zone which does not 
allow for such a use is a violation of the LaVerkin City Code and grounds for revocation or non-
renewal of a business license pursuant to LaVerkin City Code § 3-1-13(A) (Revocation or Denial 
of License). Said section states in part: 
(A) Failure to Comply; Unlawful Activities: Any license issued pursuant to the 
provisions of this Code or of any ordinance of the city may be revoked any 
application denied by the city because of: (1) the failure of the licensee or 
applicant to comply with the conditions and requirements of this code or any 
ordinance of the city, (2) unlawful activities conducted or permitted on the 
premises where the business is conducted. 
ii. The City's decision to revoke/not renew Stevens' Business License was not 
arbitrary or capricious 
The City's decisions to revoke Stevens' Business License were not arbitrary and 
capricious decisions. Under U.C.A. § 10-3-703.7(5)(a)(ii), in alleging a wrongful decision by an 
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administrative agency, the plaintiff "may only allege that the administrative proceeding's 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal." (emphasis added). There is simply no evidence or 
any set of facts that show arbitrary, capricious, or illegal action on the part of the City in this 
case. 
Stevens' complaint generally alleges that the City created and enforced new requirements 
for his CUPs (which was within the City's authority and discretion) and that the City refused to 
renew the CUP for the 160 South property and the 95 South property (also within the City's 
authority and discretion due to Stevens' noncompliance with City requirements). See Stevens' 
Complaint f^ 41, 42, 48, 50, 51, 61. Stevens further alleges that the City's revocation of his 
business license and actions to criminally prosecute him for unlawfully running a business 
without a license were intended to force him to sell his properties. See Stevens' Complaint ^[71, 
73, 78, 79. However, the standard of whether these actions were proper is not whether Stevens 
ultimately agreed with the results — the standard is whether the City acted arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or illegally in its actions. The record is full of facts, meeting minutes, and 
deposition testimony that show the City had a reasonable and appropriate basis for its decisions. 
For example, Stevens continuously failed to comply with City ordinances and conditions placed 
on his property. Further, the record shows Stevens' "Grandfathered Uses" were abandoned when 
he failed to comply with the conditions placed upon his 95 South State CUP and his 160 South 
State CUP. As such, there is sufficient evidence showing that the City's decisions were neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, but rather based upon the enforcement of its ordinances. Accordingly, 
this Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the City. 
In Dairy Prod. Serv. v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme 
Court found that the City of Welsville did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the revocation of 
the plaintiffs business license. The court based this position on the fact that the City of 
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Wellsville considered complaints of residents, took steps to investigate the problem, held a 
hearing and afforded other administrative remedies. Dairy Prod. Serv., 13 P.3d 581, 592-593. 
The material facts in the case at bar demonstrate that the City's land use decisions were 
the result of careful consideration and were supported by substantial evidence, which precludes a 
finding that the City's decisions were arbitrary and capricious. See generally Springville 
Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 1999). In the instant 
case, Stevens had opportunity to present his position, and the record shows that the City 
considered many factors in making its decisions. The City investigated the problem using 
surveillance of the area, testimony, and other administrative investigation tools. The City also 
entertained complaints submitted by residents of the City. After investigating the matter, the 
City found that Stevens had expanded his business operation into a full-fledged automobile 
wrecking/salvage business and that he had not complied with various conditions of his 95 South 
State CUP and his 160 South State CUP. As a result, the City initiated the proper proceedings to 
revoke his CUPs. 
In both instances the City first attempted to modify Stevens' CUPs before it outright 
revoked them. Only after repeated non-compliance and insolence by Stevens did the City take 
the final step and revoked his CUPs. Further, only after Stevens continued to operate his business 
with revoked CUPs did the LaVerkin City Council the City Clerk's decide to not renew/revoke 
Stevens' Business License. At its January 18, 2006, meeting the LaVerkin City Council, citing 
Section 3-l-13(A) of the LaVerkin City Code, ratified its staffs decision to not renew/revoke 
Stevens' Business License because he was operating an illegal business in a general commercial 
zone. This decision was not arbitrary or capricious. It was based on the undisputed facts. It was 
done in compliance and under the authority of its ordinance an the general police power granted 
it by the Utah Constitution. In short, Stevens simply cannot present any evidence that would 
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indicate the City acted arbitrarily or capriciously and thus any judicial review, timely requested 
or not, should affirm the City's actions. 
III. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN AN INVERSE 
CONDEMNATION ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
a. The undisputed facts prove that Stevens cannot support his claim for inverse 
condemnation. 
The City's actions in this case do not give rise to a claim for inverse condemnation. 
"Under Utah law, an action for inverse condemnation requires: (1) property, (2) a taking or 
damaging, and (3) a public use/' Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 63 P.3d 705, 717 (Utah 2002). 
In this case, Stevens did not have a protected property interest in his business and there is no 
compensable taking or damaging for public use by the City. The City's own definition of a 
regulatory taking is in LaVerkin Code § 1-10-2, 1-10-3 and shows that there cannot be a taking 
in this instance: 
B. Regulatory Taking 
1. Action by the city involving regulation of real property which results in 
the diminution in value of the property (but which does not deprive the 
landowner of all economic use) is not a regulatory taking where the land 
use regulation substantially advances a legitimate interest. 
2. Action by the city involving regulation of real property which results in 
the deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the property is not a 
regulatory taking where the use sought for the property is already 
proscribed by federal law, state law, local law or this state's common law 
of property and nuisance. 
First, Stevens did not have a recognizable property interest in the continuation of his 
business under the exact conditions established in 1999. As discussed above, the City has 
authority to change the provisions of a CUP and may make a CUP contingent on compliance 
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with those provisions. "[Tjo create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish 
rights more substantial in nature than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or 
benefits. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1995) (finding that renewal of 
lease does not constitute property interest subject to taking requirements). 
Second, Stevens has not been deprived of all economically beneficial use of his property. 
Stevens claims that his current business under its current scope is the only profitable use of his 
land and conditions which restrict his property to an "Auto Body Repair Shop" constitute a 
damaging and taking of his property. This claim fails under Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
which found that land use decisions which restrict an individual's property do not in themselves 
reveal arbitrary action or discriminatory treatment. 123 Utah 107, 255 P. 2d 723 (1953). Stevens 
still has many profitable uses available for his land - he is not confined to the operation of a 
salvage yard. Thus, although Stevens' claims that the City's restrictions prevent him from 
running a profitable repair business may be sympathetic, the claims do not carry legal weight. 
b. The revocation/nonrenewal of Stevens' business license does not constitute a 
taking. 
The Revocation of Stevens' business license does not constitute a taking. In Dairy Prod. 
Sery,, the Court found that the City's refusal to renew a business license was not a taking. 
[CJities have independent authority, apart from the specific grants of 
authority, to pass ordinances reasonably related to the objectives of the 
granted authority. As long as the legislature has not specifically limited 
the powers of the cities, we will not interfere with the means selected to 
carry out the granted authority unless it is arbitrary, or is directly 
prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the policy of, the state or federal laws 
or the constitution of this State or of the United States. 
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Dairy Prod. Serv., 13 P.3d 581, 589-590. The Court in Dairy Prod. Serv., also found that "[c]ity 
councils have been granted the authority to regulate businesses within the city limits through 
business licensing and ordinances. Id. Thus, under Utah law, the City in this case had the 
authority to enforce land use requirements by revoking/not renewing Stevens' license. 
c. Even if the Court decides there was a taking, the City complied with Stevens' 
due process rights. 
Even if the Court decides that Stevens had a property interest in his business license, the 
City afforded Stevens due process. "[D]ue process can be satisfied via notice and a hearing." 
Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, P. 59-60 (Utah 2006); see also Dairy Prod. Serv., 
13 P.3d 581, 592 (Utah 2000) (finding the due process necessary for City decisions regarding 
land use is notice and an opportunity to be heard). In this case, Stevens has admitted that he had 
notice of each of the hearings where the City made changes in his CUPs, revoked the permits or 
revoked his business license. In fact, the record shows that Stevens was allowed to make 
statements at those meetings and that Stevens was represented by counsel. Further, the City gave 
Stevens notice of his right to a formal hearing and the right to appeal to the Board of 
Adjustments under LaVerkin City Code. Thus, any argument that the City deprived Stevens of 
his due process rights is at odds with the undisputed facts, the evidence and testimony in this 
case. 
d. Even if the Court decides there was a taking, the City offered just 
compensation for Stevens' land. 
The City offered just compensation to purchase Stevens land to settle this matter and 
avoid any further dispute. The City offered Stevens $310,000 after a mutually agreed upon 
appraisal by an appraiser of Stevens' choice. The appraiser found Stevens' property to be valued 
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at $300,000. Constitutional provisions do not ensure that a property owner receive more than the 
property is worth, which is actually what the city offered, constitutional provisions simply 
require that Stevens be offered just compensation for the taking of his property See Farmers 
New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City 803 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 1990). Further, "In 
Utah...under the statutes and case law, damages which are not a direct and necessary 
consequence of the construction or operation of a public use are not recoverable in an inverse 
condemnation action." Id. Under this reasoning, Stevens cannot claim more in damages than the 
value of his property, which value was completely taken into consideration in the appraisal. 
Thus, Stevens cannot claim the City is responsible for lost profits and other consequential 
damages, and the City has shown that it was prepared to offer just compensation for Stevens' 
land. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City of LaVerkin, respectfully requests that the Court grant 
its Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs claims against the City with prejudice. 
DATED this Z ^ day of October, 2006. 
BINGHAM & SNOW, L.L.P. 
[cJ^ 
Heath H. Snow, Esq. 
Special Counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimant, 
City of LaVerkin 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a full, true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT via 1st Class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid on the Z£> day of 
October, 2006, to the persons and addresses set forth below: 
Robert C. Avery, Esq. 
Jerry D. Reynolds, Esq. 
Bruce M. Franson, Esq. 
ACIONE, HEIDEMAN & McKAY, LLC 
2696 North University Ave., Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84604 
jfena M. Thomas, Legal Assistant 
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HEATH H. SNOW, ESQ., Utah Bar. (#8563) 
BINGHAM & SNOW, L.L.P. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsnow.com 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR or KEYSTONE AUTO, LLC, 
individually. 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 060500154 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
Based on Defendant City of LaVerkin's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff 
Robert C. Stevens and the Memorandum in Support of said Motion, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Defendant be granted in the above matter. 
DATED this day of Novembei 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
^J UMUilML 
r •• 
HEATH H. SNOW, ESQ., Utah Bar. (#8563) 
BINGHAM & SNOW, L.L.P. 
Attorneys for DefendantCounterclaimant 
230 North 1680 East, Suite D-l 
St. George, Utah 84790 
(435) 656-1900 phone 
(435) 656-1963 fax 
www.binghamsnow. com 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
\r 
V . 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
V. 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR or KEYSTONE AUTO, LLC, 
individually. 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[Proposed] 
Case No.: 060500154 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed and considered the parties' memoranda and 
supporting papers, makes the following Ruling: 
FINDINGS OF FACT1 
1. On October 26, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment along with 
a memorandum in support. 
2. The motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support were received at 
the law firm of Ascione Heideman & McKay ("AHM")—attorneys for the Plaintiff—on October 
30, 2006. 
3. At the time, the AHM law firm was undertaking office renovation and expansion 
because it had hired three new attorneys. 
4. Robert Avery, an attorney with AHM, was the attorney primarily responsible for 
handling Plaintiffs case. Jerry D. Reynolds, another attorney in the AHM firm, also appeared 
with Mr. Avery on the case. 
5. In the course of AHM's office renovations, Mr. Avery's office was being 
relocated to another floor of the building in which the law firm was located. During the time he 
was waiting for his new office to be ready and equipped, Mr. Avery worked from home or from 
temporarily vacant desks in the office. He also had limited access to the legal files normally in 
his possession. 
These factual findings are based on the documentary evidence (affidavits) submitted by the parties in their 
briefing to the Court on the motion to set aside. 
6. At this time Mr. Avery also received a new personal assistant, Mrs. Carolyn 
Braithwaite. 
7. Mrs. Braithwaite, while admitting that AHM received the motion for summary 
judgment on October 30th, could not recall doing anything to track the motion for summary 
judgment once it was received. 
8. It is not known whether Mr. Reynolds was facing the same issues as Mr. Avery. 
9. In the midst of this, the deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment 
had come and gone. 
10. On November 20, 2006, Mr. Avery received Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and supporting papers. 
11. Though the motion for summary judgment was received by the law firm on 
October 30, it is not known—and Plaintiff submitted no evidence to show—where the motion for 
summary judgment was from October 30 to November 20 and why it took twenty days to find its 
way into Mr. Avery's hands. 
12. Upon receiving the motion, Mr. Avery called counsel for the Defendant, Heath 
Snow, and requested additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. 
13. Mr. Snow, however, having waited the period of time required for an opposition 
memorandum, and having received none, had already submitted the matter to the Court for 
decision. 
14. On December 1, 2006, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant. 
15. Plaintiff filed his motion to set aside that judgment on January 9, 2007. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To obtain relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), a party against whom judgment 
has been entered must show: (1) the judgment was entered against him for any of the reasons 
specified in Rule 60(b); (2) his motion to set aside the judgment is timely; and (3) he has a 
meritorious defense to the action. .See Erickson v. Schenkers Inf 1 Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 
1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (citing State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)). 
A. Timeliness 
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that the motion to set aside was timely filed 
insofar as it was submitted shortly after the final judgment had been entered and therefore within 
a reasonable time as it relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(6) argument, and within 3 months as it 
relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(1) argument. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
B. Rule 60(b) Reasons 
Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered against him for the reasons specified in 
Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). The Court addresses these in turn. 
L Rule 60(b)(1) 
Plaintiff2 first asserts that the final judgment was entered against him because of mistake, 
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered 
2
 While the actions specified in Plaintiffs motion to set aside and papers in support are the actions of the 
Plaintiffs attorneys (now former attorneys), the Court generally refers to them as the actions of the Plaintiff insofar 
as an attorney's conduct is ordinarily attributable to the client because an attorney is acting as an agent for the client. 
See Menzies. 2006 UT 81 at f76. 
against him because he did not timely receive a copy of Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and supporting materials. Plaintiff argues this was the result of a "perfect storm." This 
"perfect storm", as described by Plaintiff, was: (1) AHM's office renovation; (2) Mr. Avery not 
having immediate access to his files; and (3) Mr. Avery hiring a new assistant, all of which 
Plaintiff argues is "unprecedented." 
The Court, however, agrees with Defendant's argument. Plaintiff has described ordinary 
challenges in day to day business at a law firm. As a result, the Court is not persuaded that these 
are circumstances that were beyond Plaintiffs control. Nor is the Court persuaded that a person 
acting prudently and with due diligence under similar circumstances would not have been able to 
respond to the motion for summary judgment within the time frame required by rule. Plaintiff 
submitted no evidence of having taken any precautions to avoid or minimize the challenges the 
AHM firm claimed to be under as a result of its office renovations. 
In short, Plaintiff admits to receiving the motion for summary judgment on October 30th. 
What happened to it for the next twenty days—until it ultimately found its way to Mr. Avery—is 
a mystery to the Court. Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with reasonable justification for 
his failure to timely oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff further argues that he was unaware of Defendant's "intent" to file a motion for 
summary judgment and therefore scheduled the office move in "good faith" not anticipating the 
delay of delivery of office furniture and other equipment. However, the parties were in the 
middle of ongoing litigation. A reasonably prudent attorney would anticipate that any motion, 
including a motion for summary judgment, could be filed by the opposing party at any time. 
While the excuses offered by Plaintiff may amount to neglect, Plaintiff has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that they amount to excusable neglect as required under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to raise a question as to the actual date of receipt of 
Defendant's request to submit, calling it a matter of importance. However, that date is irrelevant 
to the timeliness of his opposition. It is undisputed that Plaintiff received the motion for 
summary judgment and did not timely file a memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment as required by Rule 7(c)(1). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the 
judgment against him resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under Rule 
60(b)(1). 
2. Rule 60(b)(6) 
Plaintiff also asserts that the judgment entered against him should be set aside under Rule 
60(b)(6) which authorizes the setting aside of a final judgment "for any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). As stated recently by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "Rule 60(b)(6) is the ecatch-all' provision of rule 60(b)." Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^71, 150 P.3d 480. As such, Rule 60(b)(6) "may not be relied upon if the 
asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b). In other words, the 
grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under other 
subsections." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, "relief under rule 60(b)(6) is meant to be the 
exception rather than the rule[,]" and should therefore be "'sparingly invoked' and used conly in 
unusual and exceptional circumstances."5 Id. (quoting Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Utah 1982)). 
Plaintiffs proffered reason is a general statement that he should have the right to have his 
dispute decided on the merits. He does not state the correct legal standard under Rule 60(b)(6), 
nor does he provide the Court with any argument or authority as to why the circumstances in this 
case are so unusual and exceptional as to justify this Court's granting relief for a reason that must 
be "sparingly invoked." 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the judgment should 
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6). 
C. Meritorious Defense 
Because the Court concludes that the judgment was not entered against Plaintiff for any 
of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b), it will not and need not address the existence of a 
meritorious defense. See State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 
(Utah 1983) (stating it is "unnecessary" and "inappropriate [] to consider the issue of meritorious 
defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown."); see also Board of 
Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963) (stating meritorious defense 
question arises only after sufficient excuse is shown). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED THIS 2007. 
Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
CITY OF LaVERKIN, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
ROBERT C. STEVENS d/b/a KEYSTONE 
REPAIR or KEYSTONE AUTO, LLC, 
individually. 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[Proposed] 
Case No.: 060500154 
Judge: Eric A. Ludlow 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed and considered the parties' memoranda and 
supporting papers, makes the following Ruling: 
FINDINGS OF FACT1 
1. On October 26, 2006, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment along with 
a memorandum in support. 
2. The motion for summary judgment and memorandum in support were received at 
the law firm of Ascione Heideman & McKay ("AHM")—attorneys for the Plaintiff—on October 
30, 2006. 
3. At the time, the AHM law firm was undertaking office renovation and expansion 
because it had hired three new attorneys. 
4. Robert Avery, an attorney with AHM, was the attorney primarily responsible for 
handling Plaintiffs case. Jerry D. Reynolds, another attorney in the AHM firm, also appeared 
with Mr. Avery on the case. 
5. In the course of AHM's office renovations, Mr. Avery's office was being 
relocated to another floor of the building in which the law firm was located. During the time he 
was waiting for his new office to be ready and equipped, Mr. Avery worked from home or from 
temporarily vacant desks in the office. He also had limited access to the legal files normally in 
his possession. 
These factual findings are based on the documentary evidence (affidavits) submitted by the parres in their 
briefing to the Court on the motion to set aside. 
6. At this time Mr. Avery also received a new personal assistant, Mrs. Carolyn 
Braithwaite. 
7. Mrs. Braithwaite, while admitting that AHM received the motion for summary 
judgment on October 30th, could not recall doing anything to track the motion for summary 
judgment once it was received. 
8. It is not known whether Mr. Reynolds was facing the same issues as Mr. Avery. 
9. In the midst of this, the deadline to respond to the motion for summary judgment 
had come and gone. 
10. On November 20, 2006, Mr. Avery received Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and supporting papers. 
11. Though the motion for summary judgment was received by the law firm on 
October 30, it is not known—and Plaintiff submitted no evidence to show—where the motion for 
summary judgment was from October 30 to November 20 and why it took twenty days to find its 
way into Mr. Avery's hands. 
12. Upon receiving the motion, Mr. Avery called counsel for the Defendant, Heath 
Snow, and requested additional time to respond to the motion for summary judgment. 
13. Mr. Snow, however, having waited the period of time required for an opposition 
memorandum, and having received none, had already submitted the matter to the Court for 
decision. 
14. On December 1, 2006, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant. 
15. Plaintiff filed his motion to set aside that judgment on January 9, 2007. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To obtain relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b), a party against whom judgment 
has been entered must show: (1) the judgment was entered against him for any of the reasons 
specified in Rule 60(b); (2) his motion to set aside the judgment is timely; and (3) he has a 
meritorious defense to the action. See Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 
1147, 1148 (Utah 1994) (citing State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 
1055-56 (Utah 1983) (plurality opinion)). 
A. Timeliness 
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that the motion to set aside was timely filed 
insofar as it was submitted shortly after the final judgment had been entered and therefore within 
a reasonable time as it relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(6) argument, and within 3 months as it 
relates to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(1) argument. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
B. Rule 60(b) Reasons 
Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered against him for the reasons specified in 
Rule 60(b)(1) and (6). The Court addresses these in turn. 
1. Rule 60(b)(1) 
Plaintiff2 first asserts that the final judgment was entered against him because of mistake, 
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the judgment was entered 
2
 While the actions specified in Plaintiffs motion to set aside and papers in support are the actions of the 
Plaintiffs attorneys (now former attorneys), the Court generally refers to them as the actions of the Plaintiff insofar 
as an attorney's conduct is ordinarily attributable to the client because an attorney is acting as an agent for the client. 
See Menzies. 2006 UT 81 at f76. 
against him because he did not timely receive a copy of Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and supporting materials. Plaintiff argues this was the result of a "perfect storm." This 
"perfect storm", as described by Plaintiff, was: (1) AHM's office renovation; (2) Mr. Avery not 
having immediate access to his files; and (3) Mr. Avery hiring a new assistant, all of which 
Plaintiff argues is "unprecedented." 
The Court, however, agrees with Defendant's argument. Plaintiff has described ordinary 
challenges in day to day business at a law firm. As a result, the Court is not persuaded that these 
are circumstances that were beyond Plaintiffs control. Nor is the Court persuaded that a person 
acting prudently and with due diligence under similar circumstances would not have been able to 
respond to the motion for summary judgment within the time frame required by rule. Plaintiff 
submitted no evidence of having taken any precautions to avoid or minimize the challenges the 
AHM firm claimed to be under as a result of its office renovations. 
In short, Plaintiff admits to receiving the motion for summary judgment on October 30th. 
What happened to it for the next twenty days—until it ultimately found its way to Mr. Avery—is 
a mystery to the Court. Plaintiff has failed to provide this Court with reasonable justification for 
his failure to timely oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff further argues that he was unaware of Defendant's "intent" to file a motion for 
summary judgment and therefore scheduled the office move in "good faith" not anticipating the 
delay of delivery of office furniture and other equipment. However, the parties were in the 
middle of ongoing litigation. A reasonably prudent attorney would anticipate that any motion, 
including a motion for summary judgment, could be filed by the opposing party at any time. 
While the excuses offered by Plaintiff may amount to neglect, Plaintiff has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that they amount to excusable neglect as required under Rule 60(b)(1). 
Finally, Plaintiff attempts to raise a question as to the actual date of receipt of 
Defendant's request to submit, calling it a matter of importance. However, that date is irrelevant 
to the timeliness of his opposition. It is undisputed that Plaintiff received the motion for 
summary judgment and did not timely file a memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment as required by Rule 7(c)(1). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the 
judgment against him resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under Rule 
60(b)(1). 
2. Rule 60(b)(6) 
Plaintiff also asserts that the judgment entered against him should be set aside under Rule 
60(b)(6) which authorizes the setting aside of a final judgment "for any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). As stated recently by the 
Utah Supreme Court, "Rule 60(b)(6) is the 'catch-all' provision of rule 60(b)." Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^{71, 150 P.3d 480. As such, Rule 60(b)(6) "may not be relied upon if the 
asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 60(b). In other words, the 
grounds for relief under 60(b)(6) are exclusive of the grounds for relief allowed under other 
subsections." Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, "relief under rule 60(b)(6) is meant to be the 
exception rather than the rule[,]" and should therefore be '"sparingly invoked' and used 'only in 
unusual and exceptional circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 
P.2d 1304, 1307-08 (Utah 1982)). 
Plaintiffs proffered reason is a general statement that he should have the right to have his 
dispute decided on the merits. He does not state the correct legal standard under Rule 60(b)(6), 
nor does he provide the Court with any argument or authority as to why the circumstances in this 
case are so unusual and exceptional as to justify this Court's granting relief for a reason that must 
be "sparingly invoked." 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to show that the judgment should 
be set aside under Rule 60(b)(6). 
C. Meritorious Defense 
Because the Court concludes that the judgment was not entered against Plaintiff for any 
of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b), it will not and need not address the existence of a 
meritorious defense. See State ex. rel. Dep't of Social Servs v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 
(Utah 1983) (stating it is '"unnecessary" and "inappropriate [] to consider the issue of meritorious 
defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown."); see also Board of 
Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963) (stating meritorious defense 
question arises only after sufficient excuse is shown). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside the Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED THIS 2007. 
Eric A. Ludlow 
District Court Judge 
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